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Abstract
The problematic features of Quines settheories NF andML are
a result of his replacing the higher-order predicate logic of type theory
by a rst-order logic of membership, and can be resolved by returning
to a second-order logic of predication with nominalized predicates as
abstract singular terms. We adopt a modied Fregean position called
conceptual realism in which the concepts (unsaturated cognitive struc-
tures) that predicates stand for are distinguished from the extensions
(or intensions) that their nominalizations denote as singular terms.
We argue against Quines view that predicate quantiers can be given
a referential interpretation only if the entities predicates stand for on
such an interpretation are the same as the classes (assuming extension-
ality) that nominalized predicates denote as singular terms. Quines
alternative of giving predicate quantiers only a substitutional inter-
pretation is compared with a constructive version of conceptual real-
ism, which with a logic of nominalized predicates is compared with
Quines description of conceptualism as a ramied theory of classes.
We argue against Quines implicit assumption that conceptualism can-
not account for impredicative concept-formation and compare holistic
conceptual realism with Quines class Platonism.
Does logic include set theory, or does logic leave o¤ where set theory
begins? That is a question that Quine has often asked, and his answer has
not always been the same. In his early work, for example, Quines answer
was that set theory was indeed part of logic, but that was because set theory
was really a cleaned upversion of higher-order logic.1 In his later work,
on the other hand, certainly at least since the Philosophy of Logic, Quines
1CF. Hahn and Schilpp 1986, p. 10.
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answer has been that set theory is not part of logic, and that is because
there really is no such thing as higher-order, as opposed to rst-order, logic.
A fundamental assumption underlying his position in both his early and his
later work is that set theory is part of logic if, and only if, logic can be divided
into an elementary, rst-order part and a nonelementary, higher-orderpart.
Indeed, Quine has continuously maintained that if there is a nonelementary,
higher-orderpart to logic, then it is the same as set theory. Thus, in his
1954 essay, Carnap and Logical Truth,Quine writes that after elementary,
rst-order logic [t]he further part of logic is set theory, which requires that
there be classes among the values of its variables of quantication(Quine
1966, p. 103). More specically, higher-orderlogic, according to Quine, is
just one or another version of rst-order set theory, and to limit logic to its
elementary, rst-order part is merely to deprive 2of the status of a logical
word(ibid., p. 104). It is only because the contrasts between elementary
logic and set theory are so fundamental,Quine has maintained, that one
might well limit the word logicto the former (though I shall not) and speak
of set theory as mathematics in a sense exclusive of logic (ibid.; italics
added). In time, Quine did make just this move, and he has maintained that
position ever since.
But is higher-order logic the same as one or another version of set theory?
Or, as Quine would have preferred it in his early works, is set theory really
just a cleaned upversion of higher-order logic? And, is set theory part
of logic if, and only if, logic can be divided into an elementary, rst-order
part and a nonelementary higher-orderpart? To the rst question, even
Quine would now say, No or, rather, he would reject it altogether, because
he now maintains that logic is not to be divided into an elementary part
and a higher-order part. But, to the second question, he must say, Yes,
because that is an assumption that he has been implicitly committed to
throughout his career. In what follows, we will not challenge Quines view
that set theory is not part of logic (and, in fact, we agree with it), but we
will reject his implicit assumption that set theory is part of logic if, and only
if, logic can be divided into a rst- and a higher-order part. In particular,
we will argue that, unlike his view of set theory today, which accords with
the iterative concept of set, Quines early views on set theory i.e., the views
he developed in his systems NF (of his 1936 paper, New Foundations for
Mathematical Logic) andML (of his 1940 book, Mathematical Logic) are
really not about sets but about classes in the logical sense, i.e., classes as the
extensions of concepts, and, consequently, that he is implicitly committed in
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his early works to a framework of concepts that can be couched only in a
higher-order logic of predication. We assume in this regard that sets are not
classes, by which we mean only classes in the logical sense, i.e., classes as the
extensions of concepts. For, whereas classes have their being in the concepts
whose extensions they are, sets have their being in their members, a fact
that is reected in the iterative process by which they are formed. That is
why there is a universal class but no universal set, and also why classes, but
not sets, have absolute complements. Both classes and sets have an axiom of
extensionality as a criterion of identity, but only sets are subject to an axiom
of foundation, which, as an essential part of the iterative process by which
they are formed, is no less essential to their individuation. Only classes, on
the other hand, are subject to Russells paradox, which is inapplicable to
sets because it assumes a pattern of set-formation that does not accord with
the iterative process by which sets are formed. Whatever Quines reasons for
having plumped forthe iterative concept of set in his later works, we agree
with his claim that set theory is not part of logic, higher-order or. otherwise,
but we reject the basis on which he makes that claim, namely, that there is
no such thing as higher-order, as opposed to rst-order, logic.
In this regard, we will rst argue against Quines replacement of a theory
of predication by a theory of membership simpliciter. We will show, in par-
ticular, how most of the problematic features of Quines settheoriesNF and
ML are easily explained once those theories are seen in their proper context
as part of a second-order logic of predication.2 We then argue against Quines
claim that bound predicate variables can only have as values the objects that
nominalized predicates denote as abstract singular terms. We will explain,
in particular; how Quines use of Russells paradox in a second-order logic
with nominalized predicates as abstract singular terms is fallacious, and how
we can even add an unstratied, impredicative comprehension principle to
the logic in question without generating any inconsistency. Then, in terms
of our own interpretation of the distinction between the concepts that pred-
icates stand for in their role as predicates and the objects that nominalized
predicates denote in their role as abstract singular terms, we argue against
Quines way of distinguishing nominalism from conceptualism, and concep-
tualism from Platonism. We call the general framework of our interpretation
of this distinction conceptual realism, and we argue that, contrary to Quines
2We will use setwith scare-quotes to indicate that, Quines intentions notwithstand-
ing, the entities in question are really not sets but classes in the logical sense.
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view of conceptualism, this framework is not restricted to a ramied predica-
tive logic. In terms of what we call holistic conceptual realism, we conclude
with a defense of not one but two alternative versions of higher-order logic as
a second-order logic with nominalized predicates as abstract singular terms.
Both are impredicative logics, and, in that regard, both contain, either di-
rectly or indirectly, an impredicative theory of classes in the logical sense, i.e.,
as the extensions of concepts. Thus, even though logic does not include set
theory, it does contain, either directly or indirectly, an impredicative theory
of classes.
1 Predication Versus Membership
According to Quine, in one of his later works, the pioneers in modern logic,
such as Frege and Russell, overestimated the kinship between membership
and predication and in that way came to view set theory as logic (Quine 1970,
p. 65). Such a claim, we maintain, is both false and misleading. Frege and
Russell did assume a logical kinship between predication and membership,
but what they meant by membership was membership in a class as the exten-
sion of a concept (where a concept is a predicable entity, i.e., a universal in
the traditional sense) and not membership in a set. Sets, unlike classes, as we
have said, have their being in their members, and in that regard there need
be no kinship at all between predication and membership in a set. Classes in
the logical sense, on the other hand, have their being in the concepts whose
extensions they are, which means that any theory of membership in a class
presupposes a superseding theory of predication.3 Frege and Russell did not
view set theory as logic, but they each did develop a theory of classes and
they each did so based on a superseding higher-order theory of predication.
Quine rejects the distinction between sets and classes in the logical sense.
He does so because he rejects the whole idea of there being predicable entities
such as concepts (or properties, or propositional functions, etc.) that are
di¤erent from the classes that are their extensions. That is why it was he,
and not Frege or Russell, who came to view set theory as logic in his early
work; and he did so by overestimating the kinship between membership and
predication in the most extreme way, namely, by identifying them. Thus,
after noting that predication was taken as a primitive of his 1932 dissertation,
which he describes as a cleaning upof Russell and Whiteheads Principia
3Cp. Frege 1979, p. 183.
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Mathematica, Quine goes on to say that because his logic was extensional
predication was membership(Hahn and Schilpp 1986, p. 10). But Freges
logic was also extensional, and it would be quite wrong to say that for him
predication was membership. Indeed, Frege is emphatic in maintaining that
a concept is logically prior to its extensionand that we should regard as
futile the attempt to take the extension of a concept as a class, and make it
rest, not on the concept, but on single things(Frege 1952, p. 106), which in
e¤ect would be to replace the logical notion of a class with the mathematical
notion of a set.
After cleaning upPrincipia in his dissertation, which he later revised
and published as System of Logistic (1934), Quine went on to develop his
settheory NF of New Foundations,which he describes as a rst-order
reconstruction of the theory of simple types. On Quines interpretation, the
real ontological import of the logico-grammatical hierarchy of the theory
of simple types resides in the constraints it imposes on the conditions for
positing sets, namely, that those conditions must be stratied with respect
to the membership relation.4 Thus, the comprehension principle for positing
sets in NF as a rst-order logic (with 2as its only primitive predicate
constant) is given as follows:
If ' is a stratied formula of NF in which y does not occur
free, then (9y)(8x)(x 2 y $ ') is a theorem of NF:
This principle, as Quine observes, is to be understood as a replacement of
the original naivecomprehension principle,
(9y)(8x)(x 2 y $ ');
where ' is any formula, stratied or not, in which y does not occur free. The
naiveprinciple must be replaced, of course, because, by putting x =2 x for
', it yields Russells paradox.
The naive comprehension principle, it should be noted, is really about
membership in a class in the logical sense. Indeed, it is really a schematic
version of a second-order principle to the e¤ect that every concept has an
extension:
(8F )(9y)(x 2 y $ F (x)):
4A rst-order formula ' with 2as its only predicate constant is stratied if there is an
assignment t of natural numbers to the variables occurring in ' such that for all variables
u; v, if u 2 voccurs in ', then t(v) = t(u) + 1.
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It is this second-order principle that expresses the logical kinship between
predication and membership, which, according to Quine, Frege and Russell
overestimated and which led them to see set theory as logic. Frege and
Russell did assume the second-order principle, and in fact it is easily seen to
be provable in the system of Freges Grundgesetze, i.e., Freges second-order
logic with abstracts as singular terms denoting value-ranges (Wertverläufe).
But, contrary to Quines claim, this does not mean that either Frege or
Russell was led to see set theory as logic, or even as a part of logic: for the
classes in question were not sets but classes as the extensions of concepts.
Frege and Russell were not concerned with set theory, but with a logic of
concepts (including relational concepts), and only thereby, derivatively, also
with a logic of the classes that are the extensions of concepts.
Russells paradox really has two forms, one in regard to membership
in a class in the logical sense, which, as already explained, presupposes a
superseding theory of predication, and the other in regard to predication,
dealing, as Russell put it in his 1902 letter to Frege, with the predicate:
to be a predicate that cannot be predicated of itself(Frege 1980, p. 130).
(Russell, in the period in question, took predicateto be synonymous with
concept.) Russell himself came to avoid the membership form of his paradox
by adopting his famous no classes theory, according to which all talk of
classes is reducible to talk of the concepts whose extensions they are. This
theory provides perhaps the strongest interpretation of what it can mean to
say that classes have their being in the concepts whose extensions they are. It
also assumes that concepts themselves are objects, contrary to Freges view
of them as ungesättigt, i.e., as unsaturated predicable entities, which does
lead to some confusion in Russells early views on the role of concepts in
predication.5 Be that as it may, Russell then came to avoid the predication
form of his paradox by adopting type-theoretical restrictions that made it
meaningless on grammatical grounds alone to predicate a concept of itself,
i.e., to apply a predicate to a nominalized form of itself as an abstract singular
term.
Quine, quite properly, rejected the grammatical restrictions Russell im-
posed on his theory of predication in order to avoid his paradox. The real
import of those restrictions was not meaningfulness but ontology. That is,
Russells type-theoretical constraints should be taken as conditions for posit-
5For a discussion of some of the di¢ culties in Russells view of the role of concepts in
predication, see Cocchiarella (1980).
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ing concepts as abstract entities and not as conditions for the meaningful
application of predicates to nominalized forms of predicates as abstract sin-
gular terms. Thus, instead of Russells grammatical division of predicates
into di¤erent logical types as a way to avoid his paradox, Quine proposed
that we should reformulate the comprehension principle for positing concepts
by requiring only that the formulas in question should all be stratied.
The idea of turning to a stratied comprehension principle for the posit-
ing of concepts was an important insight, and, as I have explained elsewhere,
it has a motivation that can be based on the original source of Russells ideas
about type theory: namely, Freges hierarchy of concepts and what I have
called Freges double-correlation thesis mapping higher-level concepts into
rst-level concepts and the latter into their extensions.6 In this regard, Quine
was right to insist on replacing Russells grammatical restrictions about the
conditions under which predicates can be applied to predicates (or, rather, to
nominalized forms of the latter) by a stratied comprehension principle. But,
he was wrong in making the additional move of identifying predication with
membership and concepts with their extensions, thereby eliminating not only
Russells division of predicates into di¤erent logical types but also, and more
importantly, the distinction between predicates and singular terms as well.
By identifying predication with membership, Quine replaced what should
have been a second-order stratied comprehension principle about predica-
tion, including the way it applies to nominalized predicates as abstract sin-
gular terms, by a rst-order stratied comprehension principle about mem-
bership. In this way, Quine rejected the whole idea of predication as some-
thing di¤erent from membership and replaced Russells higher-order theory
of predication by a rst-order theory of membership, which he has continued
to describe as a version of set theory, but which he no longer considers to be
part of logic.
2 Old Versus New Foundations
The idea of a stratied comprehension principle for second-order predicate
logic with nominalized predicates as abstract singular terms is a return to
old foundations of logic, as opposed to Quines new foundations; that is, it is
a return to foundations based on a theory of predication instead of a theory
of membership. In its simplest form, the idea is to modify Freges original
6Cf. Cocchiarella 1985b and 1986c.
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second-order predicate logic (as described in his Begri¤sschrift) by allowing
nominalized predicates to occur as singular terms on a par with individual
variables. This is a somewhat simpler version than Freges own extension
of his logic in his Grundgesetze where predicate nominalizations are repre-
sented by the application of his smooth-breathing abstraction operator to
open formulas.7 In this simpler version, to nominalize a predicate, which we
assume has parentheses (and commas, in the case of a relational predicate)
surrounding its subject-positions, we need simply delete the parentheses (and
commas) that are an integral part of that predicate in its role as a predicate.
Thus, for example, in the following analysis of membership in terms of pred-
ication,
x 2 y =df (9F )[y = F ^ F (x)];
we have a predicate letter occurring in the deniens both in its role as a pred-
icate (with its accompanying pair of parentheses) and (without its accom-
panying pair of parentheses) as an abstract singular term, i.e., as a singular
term on a par with individual variables.8 On this analysis, given Russells
view of concepts as having an individual as well as a predicable nature, we
have another version of Russells no classestheory, according to which all
talk of classes is explained in terms of talk of concepts. Actually, even aside
from Russells no classestheory, this analysis of membership corresponds
very closely to Freges own denition (as represented by the function  \ 
given in Volume 1, sec. 34, of his Grundgesetze). That is, given Freges
view of concepts as unsaturated predicable entities (as opposed to Russells
view of concepts as higher-order objects), as well as his view of nominalized
predicates as denoting the extensions of the concepts that those predicates
otherwise stand for in their role as predicates, the above analysis of member-
ship also expresses Freges view of what it means for a class to have its being
in the concept whose extension it is.
Before stating the second-order stratied comprehension principle for con-
cepts, we should note that, because relational predication is also taken prim-
itively, we. must require that the formulas occurring in such a principle must
7Cf. Cocchiarella (1986c, sec. 4) for a detailed defense of the claim that Freges
abstracts for value-ranges amounted to his logical treatment of nominalized predicates as
abstract singular terms.
8This means that in addition to (8y)' !  (x=y) as an instance of the rst-order
universal instantiation law, we also have (8y)'! '(F=y). For the formal details of these
matters, see Cocchiarella (1986a, chap. 4).
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be not merely stratied but homogeneously stratied.9 Otherwise, predica-
tion, which is speciable by means of a heterogeneously-stratied formula,
will itself be construed as a relation, in which case Russells paradox will
again be provable. Thus, in this reconstruction of our old foundations for
logic, which we call HST (for homogeneous simple types as a second-order
logic with nominalized predicates as abstract singular terms), the stratied
comprehension principle for positing concepts can now be stated as follows
(for all positive integers n):
(HSCP): If ' is a homogeneously-stratied formula in which
F does not occur free, then (9F )(8x1):::(8xn)[F (x1; :::; xn)$ ']
is a theorem of HST.
Note that because all formulas of standard second-order logic (i.e., formulas
having no nominalized predicates occurring as singular terms) are homoge-
neously stratied,HST includes all instances of the comprehension principle
of standard second-order logic among its theorems; and in fact it contains
standard second-order predicate logic as a proper part of itself.10 Given the
above analysis of membership, HST also contains Quines stratied com-
prehension principle for membership, which, along with the reasons already
given, is why we say that the classes of NF are really classes in the logical
sense.
Of course, Quine also assumed the extensionality axiom,
(ext) (8y)(8z)[(8x)(x 2 y $ x 2 z)! y = z];
as a basic law of logic (that is, of NF when he took it to be the nonelementary
part of logic), and (ext) is not provable in HST. Stated in this unqualied
way, the extensionality axiom, (ext), has some rather strange and unde-
sirable consequences in NF, which, signicantly, are not provable in HST
even when an extensionality axiom is added to the latter. One problem with
(ext), for example, is that it leaves no way in NF by which to distinguish
9A formula ', based on predication rather than membership, is homogeneously stratied
if there is an assignment t of natural numbers to both the predicate and singular terms
occurring in ' such that for each atomic subformula R(a1; :::; an) of ', (1) t(ai) = t(aj),
for all i; j such that 1  i; j  n, and (2) t(R) = t(a1) + 1. (Also, in case identity is taken
as a primitive logical constant instead of being dened as indiscernibility, then t(a) = t(b)
for all identity formulas (a = b) occurring as part of '.)
10For the formal details in the description of HST, see Cocchiarella (1986a, chap. 4).
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concrete objects (i.e., non-classes) from the empty class, because both the
empty class and any object that is not a class are memberless and, therefore,
vacuously have the same members. To resolve this problem, Quine proposed
that non-classes can be identied with their singletons and, therefore, that
they can be construed as classes after all. Alternatively, Quine could have in-
troduced another primitive predicate intoNF by which to distinguish classes
from non-classes. For example, Quine could have taken Classas a primitive
predicate constant and assumed
(8y)(8z)[Class(y) ^ Class(z) ^ (8x)(x 2 y $ x 2 z)! y = z)
instead of (ext), in which case it would not follow that all non-classes are
identical with the empty class.
Quine, apparently, was reluctant to introduce any descriptive predicate
constant intoNF as a primitive of what he then viewed as the nonelementary
part of logic. For the di¤erence between logic and its applications is that logic
includes no primitive descriptive constants as a proper part of itself, which
is why 2, taken as a replacement for predication, was originally construed
by Quine as a logical constant. Of course, had he left predication intact and
adopted a second-order logic with nominalized predicates as abstract singular
terms, the axiom of extensionality (in the monadic case) would have been
formulated simply as:
(Ext) (8F )(8G)[(8x)(F (x)$ G(x))! F = G];
in which case, because of the fundamental logical distinction between predi-
cates and singular terms, there is no need to introduce a descriptive predicate
to mark the distinction between concepts and objects. Nor, of course, is there
any need to construe all individuals as classes, such as Quine proposed in his
defense of (ext) as a basic law of logic.
Quines proposal to construe all individuals as classes can be represented
in monadic HST as follows:
(Q) (8x)(9F )(x = F ):
We do not suggest that we take this proposal seriously; but it is notewor-
thy that on the basis of our Fregean analysis of membership every theorem of
Quines so-called settheoryNF is a theorem of monadicHST+(Ext)+(Q),
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which again justies our claim that the classes of NF are not sets but classes
in the logical sense. We might also note that, by misconstruing predicates as
singular terms and identifying predication with membership, every theorem
of monadic HST+(Ext)+(Q) is translated into a theorem of NF.11
Quines thesis, (Q), is provably equivalent in monadic HST+(Ext)
to the extensionality axiom (ext); that is,
(Ext) `HST  [(Q)$ (ext)]
Therefore, from the perspective of our old foundations, as represented by
HST, whatever problems Quine has with his extensionality axiom, (ext),
in his new foundations are really the result of his proposal to construe all
individuals as classes. One such problem in particular is the fact that on the
basis of (ext) as an axiom of NF, Ernst Specker (1953) was able to show that
the axiom of choice is refutable in NF and, therefore, that there must exist
innite classes inNF (since the axiom of choice is provable for nite classes).
The axiom of choice is compatible with the theory of types, however, and
not refutable in it; and the axiom. of innity, which in the theory of types
is taken as a contingent matter (about the number of concrete individuals
in the world), is certainly not provable in that framework other than on the
basis of its own assumption. Clearly, something has gone wrong with Quines
reconstruction of the theory of types as a rst-order theory of membership.
What has gone wrong, apparently, is Quines identication of predica-
tion with membership, and of concepts with their extensions. Indeed, as is
shown elsewhere (in Cocchiarella 1985b), the axiom of choice is not refutable
in HST+ (Ext), nor is it provable (except by assuming additional ax-
ioms) that there are any innite classes. In fact, what can be proved is that
HST+ (Ext) is equiconsistent with the theory of simple types (when ex-
tensionality axioms are added to the latter).12 Thus, it is the return to old
foundations about predication, not Quines new foundations about member-
ship, that is the proper way to view his insight about replacing Russells
grammatical restrictions by a stratied comprehension principle. Also, from
this perspective, it is easily seen how it is Quines proposal to construe all
individuals as classes (or concept-correlates) that leads to the problematic
results that Specker has proved about NF.
11Cf. Cocchiarella (1986a, chap. 4, sec. 9) for more details of this relationship between
NF and HST+(Ext)+(Q).
12See Cocchiarella 1985b, sec. 6.
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Finally, we might note that the second-order principle that expresses the
logical kinship between predication and membership, i.e.,
(8F )(9y)(8x)(x 2 y $ F (x));
is not only consistent but is in fact provable in HST on the basis of the
Fregean analysis of membership given above. Indeed, it is precisely on the
basis of this principle, together with the homogeneously-stratied compre-
hension principle for concepts, that we are able to derive Quines stratied
comprehension principle for classes as a theorem schema of HST. Thus,
it is only on the basis of the logical kinship between predication and mem-
bership in a class as the extension of a concept that Quines principle, as a
thesis about the conditions under which classes can be said to exist, can be
validated. From the perspective of HST as a way of returning to our old
foundations for logic, in other words, Frege and Russell did not overestimate
the kinship between predication and membership but had it exactly right.
3 Concepts Versus Ultimate Classes
Quines problem with concepts, or attributes, or any other candidate for a
predicable entity, is that we seem to have no adequate principle of individu-
ation for them. Indeed, Quines recurring dictum is that there is no entity
without identity(cf. On the Individuation of Attributes,in Quine 1981).
Of course, by identity Quine means a relation between objects, and, as in
Freges logic, there are good reasons not to think of concepts as objects.
In responding to such an objection, Quine wonders whether we might just
acquiesce in the faulty individuation of attributes ... by treating them as
twilight entities, only real enough to be talked of in a few limited contexts,
excluding the identity context(Quine 1981, p. 107).
What Quine proposes as a way of dealing with concepts or attributes as
twilight entities is that we should construe them as ultimateclasses and,
in particular, as the ultimate classes that he introduced in the development
of his 1940 system ML. For the ultimate classes of ML are like concepts
or attributes as naively considered in that they are specied inML through
an unqualied, impredicative comprehension principle, and for that reason,
given Russells paradox, they also could have been said by Quine to have
a shadowy existence, or faulty individuation-though in fact Quine does not
speak of them this way. In ML, which contains all of the classes of NF
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but goes beyond them in containing ultimate (or proper) classes as well, the
classes that do not have an individuation problem are called sets, by which
Quine now means any class that is a member:
Set(x) =df (9z)(x 2 z):
That is, to be a member, on this construal of Quine, is the same as to be an
object whose individuation is not in question. In NF all classes are setsin
this sense, because in NF every object belongs at least to its singleton, as
well as to many other classes. The ultimate classes ofML, on the other hand,
although they are objects in the sense of being values of bound individual
variables, are classes that are not members of any other classes and, therefore,
like concepts or attributes, their individuation should also be said to be
faulty, or at least in question (though Quine, as we have said, does not
speak of them in this way). Of course, the individuationof concepts as
unsaturated predicable entities is problematic only because concepts are not
objects to begin with (i.e., they are not values of bound individual variables),
whereas ultimate classes, in order to be objects (that is, in order to be values
of bound individual variables), must be individuated. The question of the
individuationof concepts is a pseudo-problem, in other words, arising from
the confusion of concepts with objects, whereas the individuation of ultimate
classes is not a pseudo-problem precisely because they are objects, or at least
they are construed as such in ML. But, then, if ultimate classes really do
have an individuation problem as objects, as we maintain they do (even if
Quine does not), why bring them in at all?
Quines original reason for adding ultimate classes to the setsof NF
was because the principle of mathematical induction,
'(0) ^ (8x)[N(x) ^ '(x)! '(x+ 1)]! (8x)[N(x)! '(x)];
is provable in NF only when the formula ' is stratied. Here, the notion of
a natural number (as represented by the predicate N) is essentially Freges,
since that is the notion that is both natural and appropriate inNF (and that
is because NF is really a theory of classes in the logical sense). As dened in
bothNF andML, in other words, a natural number is any class that belongs
to every class (ultimate or otherwise) to which 0 belongs and which is closed
under the successor relation. By denition, accordingly, the only form of
mathematical induction that can be proved inNF is one that is restricted to
stratied formulas (even though not all of the formulas of NF are stratied),
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because, on the basis of the stratied comprehension principle, it is only those
formulas that are primitively assumed to have classes corresponding to them
in NF. In ML, however, stratication is not necessary for the specication
of ultimate classes but only for classes .that are elements, i.e., classes whose
individuation is not in question (regardless of whether they are grounded
or not). Thus, given Freges denition of natural number, mathematical
induction is provable in ML without the restriction to stratied formulas
that is required in NF.
The problem with this solution is that, unlike the situation in NF, where
all classes are elements, or sets, we cannot prove that the class of natural
numbers is a set, i.e., that it does not have a faulty individuation. We can,
of course, simply assume as an additional axiom that the class of natural
numbers is a set; but, as has been argued by others, if we can add axioms
toML in this way, why not just stick withNF and add an axiom to the e¤ect
that mathematical induction holds for all formulas, stratied or otherwise?
(Cp. Fränkel et al., 1973, p. 171.) Why assume that there are classes at
all whose individuation is a problem? Or, more to the point, at least from
Quines perspective, why assume that there are objects (i.e., values of bound
individual variables) that cannot be members of any class at all, not even of
their singletons? No paradox is forthcoming on the assumption that there
are at least nite classes of ultimate classes, e.g., singletons, doubletons, etc.,
though of course allowing that would mean giving up Quines analysis of
set. What, then, is the real ontological point of that analysis?
Quine does not exclude the identity context in his talk of ultimate classes,
it should be noted, for he maintains that the axiom of extensionality, which
in ML has the same unqualied form as in NF, amounts to a principle of
individuation for classes, ultimate or otherwise. In other words, ultimate
classes have the same principle of individuation as the classes that are sets.
But, then, how are we to explain the di¤erence between classes that are sets
and those that are not, i.e., those that are ultimate? Clearly, short of being
merely a form of dogma, there has to be an explanation for the di¤erence
between ultimate classes and classes that are sets especially if ultimate
classes are taken as a way of dealing with such twilight entities as concepts.
Again, what is the real ontological import of Quines analysis of set? And,
given his commitment even inML to construing all objects as classes, what
does that analysis have to say about the being of objects whose individuation
is not in question?
There are good answers to these questions, but they cannot be found in
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ML itself. For, the problem here seems once again to be Quines insistence on
identifying predication with membership and concepts with classes, some of
which are now said to be ultimate while others are not. Thus, in identifying
predication with membership and concepts with classes, ultimate or other-
wise, Quine in e¤ect reduces all second-order notions (such as the functional
role of concepts as unsaturated predicable entities and the sui generis referen-
tial role of predicate quantiers regarding such entities) to rst-order notions,
thereby representing concepts as objects (i.e., as values of bound individual
variables) and predicate quantiers as rst-order objectual quantiers. The
solution to Quines problems with ML is not to identify predication with
membership and concepts with classes, ultimate or otherwise, but to return
to our old foundations and get rid of ultimate classes in favor of concepts.
We need to return to a Fregean view of logic (or a variant thereof), in other
words, where concepts are unsaturated predicable entities and membership
is based on predication and not a substitute for it.
The simplest way to describe the kind of Fregean view we have in mind
here is rst to return to our old foundations of logic with nominalized pred-
icates as abstract singular terms as represented by HST, which, as already
noted, is the framework that explained the oddities of Quines new foun-
dations, NF. Also, let us conservatively extend HST by introducing -
abstracts into it as complex predicate expressions. For obvious reasons, we
call the result of extending HST* in this way HST. Note that, like simple
predicates (i.e., predicate variables and constants), all -abstracts have a pair
of parentheses (and commas in the case of a relational predicate) surrounding
their subject positions, and, as with simple predicates, they are nominalized
and transformed into abstract singular terms by simply deleting their accom-
panying pair of parentheses (and commas). Also, as predicate expressions,
all -abstracts are taken as legitimate substituends of the bound predicate
variables, which, logistically, can be succinctly expressed as follows (where F
is not free in '):
(9F )([x1; :::xn'] = F ):
This formula, which can itself be taken as a more fundamental form of com-
prehension principle, yields, on the basis of Leibnizs law, the more familiar
comprehension principle,
(9F )(8x1):::(8xn)(F (x1; :::; xn)$ '):
InHST, however, the latter must be homogeneously stratied, which means
that in HST, as a conservative extension of HST, all -abstracts, as
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a matter of logical grammar alone, must also be homogeneously stratied,
since otherwise we would be able to prove a comprehension principle that
goes beyond what we can prove in HST.
Now, from a conceptual point of view, the exclusion of inhomogeneously-
stratied -abstracts from the class of grammatically well-formed predicate
expressions seems inappropriate and counter-intuitive. How, in particular,
could Russell even have formulated his paradox of predication if he could
not form a concept corresponding to the complex predicate [x(9G)(x =
G ^ :G(x))], which obviously is not homogeneously stratied?13 Here, of
course, we must keep in mind that, contrary to Russells view of the mat-
ter, concepts are unsaturated predicable entities and not independently real
objects. Thus, in particular, it is one thing to maintain that the Russellian
predicate, [x(9G)(x = G ^ :G(x))], when nominalized and construed as
an abstract singular term, fails to denote any object at all, and altogether
quite another to maintain that the same predicate is meaningless in its role
as a predicate and cannot stand for a concept. Unlike Quines move from
NF toML, in other words, there are good reasons, independent of the issue
of being able to prove an unqualied version of mathematical induction, to
modify the logic of HST by allowing all -abstracts to be well-formed
predicate expressions.
The point of the modication of HST that we are proposing here is that
on a Fregean view of concepts (or a variant thereof, such as we will consider
later) there is a di¤erence between the laws of compositionality for concept-
formation and the laws regarding the conditions under which concepts, as
unsaturated predicable entities, have objects, e.g., extensions, corresponding
to them. This means that the thesis that every singular term (including
nominalized predicates) of our logical language must denote can no longer
be taken as a law of logic; that is, we must replace the standard rst-order
logic that is part of HST by a rst-order logic that is free of existential
presuppositions for singular terms. In this way, in regard to Russells paradox
of predication, we can maintain, on the basis of our more fundamental form
of comprehension principle, that there is indeed a concept corresponding to
the Russell predicate, i.e.,
(9F )([x(9G)(x = G ^ :G(x))] = F );
13For this version of Russells paradox, see Russell (1937, p. 97), where he describes
the concept in question in terms of what seems like a complex relation, namely the
combination of nonpredicability with identity.
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even though that concept has no object corresponding to it as its concept-
correlate (e.g., as its extension); that is, even though,
:(9y)([x(9G)(x = G ^ :G(x))] = y);
is also provable (as a result of Russells argument). Which concepts do have
objects corresponding to them as their concept-correlates? Well, minimally,
we can assume, analogous to Quines extension of NF toML, that all of the
objects denoted by nominalized predicates in HST are also denoted by
nominalized predicates of the new logic, which we call HST Both HST

andHST, incidentally, as alternative reconstructions of our old foundations
for logic as based on predication, can be shown to be consistent relative to
weak Zermelo set theory.14
The questions we raised about Quines systemML can now be answered
in terms of the logical systemHST or, rather, in terms of (monadic)HST

+
(Ext) + (Q), where the objects corresponding to concepts are taken to be
classes in the logical sense, i.e., classes as the extensions of those concepts.
We include Quines thesis, (Q), that all objects are classes not because we
think that it is true (we dont) but because that is what Quine assumes in
adopting his unqualied axiom of extensionality, (ext), even in ML. Now,
from the perspective of this new version of our old foundations for logic, all
of the classes of ML, ultimate or otherwise, are really concepts misconstrued
as objects. Many, even if not all, of the concepts of HST have objects cor-
responding to them, which, on the assumption of the extensionality axiom
(Ext), can be taken as the extensions of those concepts. Those extensions,
or classes, turn out to be the objects referred to by Quine as sets, because
in fact it is true of all objects whatsoever in HST+ (Ext
) that they be-
long to some class or other, which on our Fregean analysis of membership
means only that they fall under some concept or other. But in HST, as an
alternative reconstruction of our old foundation for logic, and in particular as
a reconstruction that is free of existential presuppositions regarding singular
terms, to fall under some concept or other is the same as to be an object,
i.e., to be the value of a bound individual variable:
`HST (9x)(a = x)$ (9F )F (a);
14Cf. Cocchiarella (1987, chap. 2, sec. 14, or chap. 4, sec. 7) for a detailed formal
description of the systemHST and for a proof of its consistency relative to weak Zermelo
set theory.
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where a is a singular term in which x is not free.15 In other words, the
real ontological import of Quines denition of setis simply an alternative
analysis of what it is to be an object simpliciter.
Ultimate classes, on this interpretation, are not objects of all, but are
really those concepts, such as the one represented by the Russell predicate,
[x(9G)(x = G^:G(x))], that have no objects corresponding to them as
their extensions. It is because ultimate classes are not objects to begin with
that they cannot be members of other classes, not even of their singletons,
since to be a member of a singleton is to fall under a concept and therefore
be an object after all. Of course, not being objects, ultimate classes have the
same individuation problem that concepts have as unsaturated predicable
entities, which is to say no problem at all, because the question of their
individuationcan be taken seriously only by misconstruing them as objects.
This does not mean that Quines dictum, no entity without identity,
must be rejected; rather, it means only that the notion of identity involved
in that dictum must not be restricted to individuals, i.e., to individuated
entities, or, in modern parlance, to objects as values of bound individual
variables. Thus, if identity is construed as a transcendental notion in the
scholastic sense, as in fact it is construed in HST as an alternative recon-
struction of our old foundations for logic, then even concepts, and therefore
ultimate classes as well on this interpretation, can have their identity despite
15It should be noted that in HST :(9y)(a = y) is not provably equivalent to
[x:(9y)(x = y)](a), because the latter formula, if true (per impossibile), involves be-
ing the value of an individual variable (viz., x) bound by the -operator, i.e., it involves
being the value of a bound individual variable after all.
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not being well-individuated entities, that is, despite not being objects.16
The reduction of ML to (monadic) HST + (Ext
) + (Q) can be de-
scribed formally in terms of a simple translation function, trs, that replaces
all of the individual variables occurring in the formulas of ML by one-place
predicate variables (where distinct individual variables are replaced by dis-
tinct predicate variables). Every formula of ML, in other words, becomes
a formula of monadic HST in which no individual variable occurs at all,
which indicates our point that ML is only about (monadic) concepts and
the extensions (if any) that are their correlates. It is now easily shown that
if ' is a theorem of ML, then the translation of 46, trs('), is a theorem of
HST + (Ext
) + (Q). (Cf. Cocchiarella (1985b, sec. 8) for the details
of a proof of this claim.)
There is no need, of course, to retain Quines thesis, (Q), that all objects
are classes (and setsin particular) in the framework of HST, where its sta-
tus as a false metaphysical thesis is rendered perspicuous. In dropping (Q)
we are no longer able to prove Quines unqualied version of the extensional-
ity axiom, (ext), but that is really as it should be. After all, if extensionality
really is an assumption that we want to make in this reconstruction of our
old foundations for logic, then the natural form of that assumption is our
second-order version of the extensionality axiom, (Ext). In any case, given
that assumption, the objects denoted by nominalized predicates, as already
noted, are none other than the extensions of the concepts those predicates
otherwise stand for in their role as predicates. Not all concepts will have
16Allowing a transcendental notion of identity marks a departure from Freges view,
we agree. We can avoid such a departure, if we wish, by simply dropping identity in
favor of indiscernibility, as is done in the version of HST formulated in the rst part of
Cocchiarella (1985a).
With identity as a transcendental notion, it is noteworthy that although it is provable
that objects that are indiscernible are therefore identical, i.e.,
`HST (8x)(8y)(x  y $ x = y);
where is dened as indiscernibility), the same cannot be said of concepts. In fact, just
the opposite holds, that is,
`HST (9F )(9G)(F  G^F 6= G):
In particular, concepts that have no objects (e.g., extensions) corresponding to them as
their concept-correlates, vacuously fall under all of the same concepts and, therefore, are
indiscernible, even though they are not the sameconcepts. For more on this, see Section
9 of the paper cited above.
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an extension corresponding to them, to be sure, which means that, in this
respect at least, Frege did overestimate the kinship between predication and
membership. That is, the second-order comprehension principle for member-
ship,
(8F )(9y)(8x)(x 2 y $ F (x));
is refuted in HST+(Ext
) (or even in just HST), given our Fregean
analysis of membership. The laws of compositionality for concept-formation,
in other words, cannot in all cases be transformed into laws regarding the
conditions under which concepts, as unsaturated predicable entities, have
extensions corresponding to them. Frege was right in maintaining that it is
by means of our logical faculties that we can lay hold upon the extension
of a concept, by starting out from the concept(Frege 1979, p. 181), but he
was wrong to think that every concept will have an extension.
In addition to those concepts for which it can be proved that they have
no extension corresponding to them, as well as those for which it is provable
that such an extension does exist, there are many concepts in the frame-
work of HST+(Ext
) for which it is neither provable nor disprovable that
those concepts have a corresponding extension. In particular, it is neither
provable nor disprovable that the Fregean concept of a natural number, i.e.,
the concept represented by the following -abstract (where S stands for the
successor relation),
[x(8F )(F (0) ^ (8y)(8z)[F (y) ^ S(y; z)! F (z)]! F (x))];
has an extension corresponding to it as its concept-correlate. That is, where
N is now dened as abbreviating this -abstract, the following existence
claim, is neither provable nor disprovable in HST+(Ext
) (with, or with-
out, (Q)).17 While this is a plausible existence claim to make, nevertheless,
adding it toHST+(Ext
) as a postulate does mean going beyond the kinds
of existence claims that can be validated on the basis of the laws of logic as
represented by this system. Indeed, this seems to be the point where mathe-
matics begins to transcend logic in just the kinds of existential posits that it
makes. Note, however, that this does not mean that mathematical concepts
are nonlogical concepts about the physical world, that is, that mathemat-
ics involves applying logic by adding descriptive constants to it that are not
analyzable in purely logical terms. Rather, it means only that mathematics
17This claim is based on a proof of the related claim for ML in Rosser (1952).
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transcends logic by assuming the existence of extensions (or even of inten-
sions in the case of intensional mathematics) as the objects corresponding to
certain concepts that otherwise cannot be proved on logical grounds alone to
have a concept-correlate. Logicism is true, in other words, only in the sense
that all of the concepts of classical mathematics can be given a purely logical
analysis, but it is false in that not all of the posits of classical mathematics
can be validated on purely logical grounds alone. It is in this way that we
see where logic leaves o¤ and mathematics begins, in other words, and not in
Quines way of taking logic to consist only of elementary, rst-order logic and
mathematics as a rst-order settheory, with or without ultimate classes.
4 Frege Versus Quine on Higher-Order Logic
According to Quine, the framework of higher-order logic
has the fault . . . of diverting attention from the major
cleavages between logic and set theory. It encourages us
to see the general theory of classes and relations as a
mere prolongation of quantication theory in which the
hitherto schematic predicate letters are newly admitted
into quantiers and into other positions that we hitherto
reserved to x, y, etc. (Quine 1963, p. 257)
Here, by the other positionsthat are reserved for the individual variables,
Quine means the subject positions that predicates bring with them in their
role as predicates. Thus, his claim is that (1) by allowing quantiers to be
a¢ xed to predicate variables we are committed to (2) allowing predicate vari-
ables, and predicate expressions in general, to be nominalized and occur as
abstract singular terms on a par with individual variables and, furthermore,
(3) that the objects (viz., classes) denoted by such abstract singular terms
are the same entities that are the values of the bound predicate variables. A
secondary claim, implicit in Quines use of hitherto, seems to be (4) that
the use of predicate variables as dummy schema letters in rst-order logic
antedates their use in the predicate quantiers of higher-order logic.
In regard rst to the secondary claim (4), let us note that by Quines
lights, our entire line of thought about predication and the logical notion of a
class springs from a wrong philosophy,and the orthodox terms rst-order
predicate logicand higher-order predicate logichave the same deplorable
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source, namely, a blurred view of ... the distinction between schematic
letters and variables, and ... between use and mention(Hahn and Schilpp
1986, 591¤.). Anyone who quanties with respect to predicate variables,
Quine insists, fails to see, or sees only dimly, that he is really assuming
new objects as values of the newly quantied variables (ibid., p. 592;
emphasis added). Quantifying with respect to predicate variables, in other
words, at least where those variables are assumed to have values, amounts
to a confusion of substitutional quantication with objectual quantication.
What Quine says here about a confusion between schematic letters and
variables, and between mention and use, is not only false but misleading as
well. It is false, in particular, that the use in rst-order logic of predicate
variables as dummy schema letters antedates the use in higher-order logic of
quantiers binding those variables. It is false because Frege, the founding
father of rst-order quanticational logic, gave us that theory only as an
integral part of his second-order logic (i.e., the logic of his Begri¤sschrift). It
is also misleading, because, by inverting the original order of the development
of mathematical logic, it tries to present the development of higher-order logic
as a mistake based on a confusion between schematic letters and variables,
and between mention and use. Bringing in mention and use confusions is an
important tactic of Quines, but, as in his application of that tactic in modal
logic, it simply begs the question at issue and amounts to an ad hominem
form of argument. For it is only by seeing things dimlyand having a blurred
viewof important distinctions, according to Quine, that one can adopt the
positions he decries.
In regard to Quines more important claim, namely, (1) that we cannot
a¢ x quantiers to predicate variables unless (2) those variables are nomi-
nalized and allowed to occur as abstract singular terms, and (3) that the
objects denoted by such abstract singular terms must be the values of the
bound predicate variables, let us note that Frege did not admit abstract sin-
gular terms at all into his original formulation of second-order logic in his
Begri¤sschrift. It was only later, in the Grundgesetze, that such terms could
be generated through the use of the smooth-breathing abstraction operator
as a nominalizing device. That was an important and novel step to take, we
agree, and, as Frege observed, in order to obtain objects out of concepts,
namely, extents of concepts or classes (Frege 1910, p. 361), it was a nec-
essary step as well. Nevertheless, Frege was clear and explicit on this being
an added step, for, he insists that we can treat the principal parts of logic
without speaking of classes, as I do in my Begri¤sschrift(ibid., p. 360). The
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logic of the Begri¤sschrift includes predicate, as well as rst-order, quanti-
ers, and although predicates are taken to stand for concepts and relations,
they are emphatically not to be taken as names or abstract singular terms
(i.e., as saturated expressions). Thus, from a Fregean point of view, Quine
is wrong in claiming that we cannot a¢ x quantiers to predicate variables
unless those variables are also allowed to occur as abstract singular terms.
He is also wrong on this interpretation in claiming that the objects denoted
by nominalized predicates as abstract singular terms must be the same en-
tities as are taken to be the values of the bound predicate variables. For
the objects (viz., classes) denoted by such abstract singular terms in Freges
Grundgesetze are not the unsaturated concepts and relations that are taken
as the values of the bound predicate variables.
It is noteworthy that in commenting on Freges logic, Quine erroneously
claimed that Frege construed a general term as naming its extension(Quine
1951, p. 90), where to say that Frege treats general terms as names of
classes ... is simply to say that he provides for substitution of general terms
for quantied class variables (ibid., p. 93). Predicate quantiers are a
defect in a theory of reference such as Freges, Quine maintained, and
he also claimed that it is he who has claried matters by keeping general
terms distinct from abstract singular terms (ibid., p. 94). In depriving
general terms or predicates of the virtues of names,Quine wrote, apparently
completely unaware that he is now voicing Freges own view of the matter,
I do not thereby deny that there are certain classes connected with them
otherwise than in the fashion of being named(ibid., p. 95).
These views about predicate quantiers and the distinction between pred-
icates and their nominalizations as abstract singular terms also occur in
Quines 1947 paper, On Universals, but there they are compounded with an
argument, namely, Russells paradox of predication, that completely fails to
hit its mark and that in fact is fallacious on Quines formulation. Thus, begin-
ning with the observation (which is not here in dispute) that if we bind the
schematic predicate-letters of quantication theory, that is, of rst-order
predicate logic (without identity), we achieve a reication of universals,
Quine goes on to claim that these universals are entities whereof predicates
may thenceforward be regarded as names (Quine 1947, p. 77). Now it is
precisely this claim that we have challenged, for, as in Freges Begri¤sschrift,
predicates do not become names just because they stand for values of bound
predicate variables. Predicates can be nominalized, we agree, i.e., they can
be transformed into abstract singular terms in just the way described in Sec-
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tion 2 above, and this in fact is just what Quine proposes in order to take in
the theory of classes(ibid., p. 78). That is, we are to allow the predicate
variables all privileges of the [individual] variables x, y, etc. The predicate
letters, when thus admitted to quantiers, acquire the status of variables
taking classes as values(ibid.). Quine then makes his by now familiar iden-
tication of predication with membership: the notation Fx(or FG, etc.),
when Fis bound, comes to mean that x (or G, etc.) is a member of the
class F(ibid.).18
Note that the logic now being described is essentially the logical sys-
tem HST described in Section 2, but without the homogeneously stratied
comprehension principle, (HSCP), as an added axiom schema. This logic,
or proper subsystem of HST (without identity), is a variation of a sys-
tem called T0 (in Cocchiarella 1973), and T

0, as is shown there, can be
given a trivial consistency proof relative to the extended propositional cal-
culus, which in turn is reducible to propositional logic simpliciter.19 In other
words, T0 can be shown to be absolutely consistent and not just relatively
consistent. How strange it is then to read Quines claim that Russells para-
dox of predication can be derived in this logic (op. cit., p. 78) and that
it is therefore inconsistent, thereby showing, supposedly, the impropriety of
quantifying and nominalizing the role of predicates.
Quines argument, needless to say, is fallacious. The critical step is his
inference from
(A) (9F )(8H)(F (H)$ G(H));
which is provable in T0, the logic in question, to
(B) (9F )(8H)(F (H)$ :H(H));
18Quine does not use parentheses, as we do, as integral parts of predicates to perspic-
uously mark o¤ the subject positions that predicates bring with them in their role as
predicates. Still, the functional role of predicates is indicated by their positions in basic
or atomic formulas. On the other hand, the claim that predicates are names and that
predication is membership does suggest that Quine may be confusing predicate positions
in atomic formulas with subject positions.
19The system T0 is described in Cocchiarella (1973, Sec. 2). Its consistency proof
amounts to simply deleting the subject positions (and the singular terms oc positions)
of each predicate occurring in a formula, thereby translating each predicate variable in a
predicate position into a propositional variable in a propositional position, resulting ín a
formula of the extended propositional calculus. It ís then easily seen that a formula is
provable in T0 only if its transform is provable in the extended propositional calculus.
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which is not provable. The fallacy in question involves substituting an open
formula, e.g., :H(x), in which H has a free predicate position occurrence, for
the free occurrence of G in (A) that occurs within the scope of the predicate
quantier (8H), thereby replacing the free predicate position occurrence of
G by a bound predicate position occurrence of H.20
The claim, which Quine does not himself make, that (B) is really an
instance of a comprehension principle is also erroneous, because no com-
prehension principle at all was assumed for this framework. Adding the
homogeneously-stratied comprehension principle, (HSCP), to T0, as al-
ready noted, results in the systemHST, which is consistent relative to weak
Zermelo set theory. But, then, (B) is clearly not an instance of (HSCP);
nor, for that matter, is it even an instance of a heterogeneously-stratied
comprehension principle. More importantly, (B) is not even an instance of
the unstratied comprehension principle,
(CP) (9F n)(8x1):::(8xn)(F (x1; :::; xn)$ ');
which (where F n is not free in ') is the comprehension principle of standard
second-order logic (without identity) extended so as to allow nominalized
predicates to occur as abstract singular terms in the formulas in question. In
particular, (B) should not be seen as derived from an instance of (CP) of
the form,
(9F )(8x)(F (x)$ :x(x));
because the latter, which contains an individual variable in a predicate po-
sition, is not even grammatically well-formed. Adding (CP) to T0, the
logical theory in question, results in the logic called T (without identity)
(in Cocchiarella 1973), and T, as is shown there, is a conservative exten-
sion of standard second-order logic, which means that T also has a trivial
consistency proof.21
It also cannot be claimed in this context, incidentally, that (B) is an
existential generalization of a denition of what it is for a concept to be
impredicable, i.e., a denition of the form:
Impred(H)$ :H(H):
20For a detailed analysis of this fallacy and of the notion of the proper substitution of
a formula for a predicate variable that is involved here when nominalized predicates are
allowed to occur as abstract singular terms, see Cocchiarella (1973, sec. 3).
21Cf. Cocchiarella (1973, Sec. 6) for a proof of the claim that T (with or without
an axiom of innity) is a conservative extension of standard second-order predicate logic
(with or without the same axiom of innity).
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What is wrong with this claim is that a denition must be noncreative,
which means that if a contradiction is provable on the basis of a denitional
extension of a theory, then a contradiction must already be provable in that
theory independently of any use of the denition in question. But whether or
not the logical background contains a comprehension principle, stratied or
otherwise, that is, whether it be T0, T
, or HST, it is in all of these cases
known to be consistent, and therefore the so-called denition in question is
not really a denition at all, but merely a spurious assumption that leads to
a contradiction.22
Finally, it should also be noted that (B) cannot be derived in T from
(9F )(8x)(F (x)$ (9G)[x = G ^ :G(x)]);
because identity has not been taken as a primitive notion of this system.
There is, of course, indiscernibility (as represented by ), which is denable
in T in the usual way and, hence, there is the following,
(9F )(8x)(F (x)$ (9G)[x  G ^ :G(x)]);
as an instance of the comprehension principle (CP). Applying Russells
argument in this case does not lead to a contradiction, however, but only
shows that in T there are indiscernible concepts that are not coextensive,
i.e.,
`T (9F )(9G)(F  G^:(8x)[F (x)$ G(x)]):
This may seem to be an odd, or counter-intuitive, result, but it must be re-
membered that indiscernibility is a relation between objects (concept-correlates
in this case) and that, unlike identity, it cannot be a transcendental notion
covering concepts as well. Frege, we agree, rejected the idea of identity as a
transcendental notion di¤erent from indiscernibility and, of course, he would
have rejected any framework in which non-coextensive concepts can have in-
discernible objects as their correlates. That does not mean, however, that
22One thing that is wrong with the denition of Impred is that it gives no truth
conditions for objects other than concept-correlates; that is, it is not dened for all objects
whatsoever, but only for those that are the correlates of concepts. The whole point of a
second-order predicate logic with nomínalízed predicates as abstract singular terms is that
predicates can be meaningfully applied to all singular terms, regardless whether the latter
denote concrete or abstract objects, and regardless whether those predicates are logically
false of those objects or not.
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there cannot be a modied Fregean framework in which the objects corre-
lated with concepts are not their extensions but, for example, their cardinal
numbers instead, in which case there would be nothing really odd about
there being non-coextensive concepts that have indiscernible objects (i.e.,
the samecardinal number) as their correlates. In any case, the important
point is that what is involved here is indiscernibility (or identitybetween ob-
jects) and not identity as a transcendental notion (i.e., not identity between
concepts).
We can add identity as a transcendental notion to the framework of T,
but, then, on pain of contradiction otherwise, we must not allow it to occur
in instances of the comprehension principle (CP). Similarly, in adding -
abstracts to the logical grammar of T, to obtain the system T. the way
that HST was obtained from HST, we must exclude the identity sign
from occurring in those -abstracts. It will then be provable in T (with
identity) that identity does not stand for a relation between objects the way
that indiscernibility does, and, by the above result about indiscernibility, that
there are distinct (nonidentical) concepts that have indiscernible concept-
correlates:
`T (9F )(9G)(F  G ^ F 6= G):
Russells paradox of predication, as these observations indicate, seems
ineluctably to involve identity and the complex concept represented by the
-abstract, [x(9G)(x = G ^ :G(x))]. This abstract, as already noted, is
not grammatically well-formed in either T (with identity) or HST (the
logic that contains a natural interpretation of Quines settheory NF), and
although it is grammatically well-formed in HST (the logic that contains
a natural interpretation of Quines settheory ML), where it stands for a
concept (as an unsaturated predicable entity), nevertheless, upon nominaliza-
tion, it fails to denote any object as the correlate of that concept. Similarly,
we can modify the rst-order logic part of T, so as to render it free of
existential presuppositions regarding singular terms, the way we modied
HST to obtain HST. In the resulting system, T

, the Russell predicate
now stands for a concept, just as it does in HST, but as in HST

 that
same predicate, when nominalized, simply fails to denote.23 These di¤erent
23Cf. Cocchiarella (1986a, chap. 4, sec. 6) for a consistency proof of T with identity.
The formal description and consistency proofs for T and T (with identíty) as well as
of HST and HST, are given in chapters 5 and 6, together with a Frege for all of these
di¤erent systems.
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systems constitute the di¤erent options that are available as a response to
Russells paradox of predication, assuming, that is, that we want to allow
for an impredicative comprehension principle covering the kinds of complex
concepts involved in Russells argument in the rst place.
Quine himself, it should be noted, avoids taking identity as a primitive
logical concept and in general attempts to explain it in terms of other notions
instead. InNF, for example, Quine denes identity as membership in all the
same classes, which on our analysis amounts to indiscernibility, i.e., as falling
under all of the same concepts. That denition su¢ ces in NF, as it does in
HST (without identity), for many of the purposes of identity, but it may be
questioned whether it really amounts to identity. With identity as primitive,
for example, the following,
F (x)$ (9z)[x = z ^ F (z)];
is a valid formula and, therefore, were identity taken as a primitive logi-
cal concept of NF, the stratied comprehension principle of NF would be
equivalent to
(9y)(8x)(x 2 y $ (9z)[x = z ^ F (z)]);
where F has only stratied formulas (in which neither y nor x have free
occurrences) as its substituends. With identity dened as membership in
all the same classes, however, that is, as indiscernibility(for which we will
continue to use ), replacing the stratied comprehension principle of NF
by
(9y)(8x)(x 2 y $ (9z)[x  z ^ F (z)]);
where the substituends of F are restricted as above, results in a system that
is decidedly weaker than NF, and in fact it results in a system that can
be proved consistent relative to weak Zermelo set theory (cf. Cocchiarella
1976). In this weaker system, moreover, membership in all the same classes,
i.e., indiscernibility, does not imply co-extensivity, and in fact the claim that
there can be indiscernible classes that are not coextensive, i.e.,
(9x)(9y)(x  y ^ :(8z)[z 2 x$ z 2 y]);
can be true in models of this weaker system. This is perhaps not so surprising
when we notice that every instance of the weaker comprehension principle is
derivable in T, where it is provable that there are non-coextensive concepts
that have indiscernible objects as their correlates. Of course, what makes
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this result so odd in the weakened version of NF is that the unqualied
extensionality axiom is also assumed there. Clearly, these results should not
be possible if Quines denition represented an adequate analysis of identity.
5 Conceptualism Versus Nominalism as
Formal Theories of Predication
There is an interpretation of predicate quantiers under which predicates
are not construed as names and predicate variables are not taken as having
classes as their values, which, in recent years, Quine seems willing to allow.
This is the so-called substitutional interpretation, according to which bound
predicate variables have no values at all but only substituends, namely, open
formulas that do not themselves contain any bound predicate variables. First-
order quantiers, which are still interpreted objectually, are in no way a¤ected
by such an interpretation, it should be emphasized, and, as Quine has pointed
out, switching to a substitutional interpretation of rst-order quantiers as
well is pointless because such an interpretation only shifts the problem of ref-
erence to singular terms, e.g., individual constants and denite descriptions.
An objectual interpretation of rst-order quantiers not only makes clear our
ontological commitments, but, in terms of those commitments, it also gives a
logically perspicuous representation of the referential role of singular terms.
It is when predicates are not themselves (mis)construed as singular terms,
according to Quine, that predicate quantiers can have no referential signif-
icance and, therefore, unless predicate quantiers are banned entirely, the
only interpretation that can be given them is substitutional. Thus, whereas
a substitutional interpretation of rst-order quantiers only obfuscates the
nature of reference, a substitutional interpretation of predicate quantiers, in
a context in which predicates are not themselves (mis)construed as singular
terms, will have no bearing at all on the notion of reference. In addition,
and perhaps more to the point of the tenor of Quines philosophy, whereas a
substitutional interpretation of rst-order quantiers will only nullify a nom-
inalistic theory of predication (according to which predicates are the only
universalsthat can be predicated of objects), a substitutional interpreta-
tion of predicate quantiers is acceptable precisely because it represents just
such a nominalistic theory (cf. Cocchiarella 1986a, chap. 1).
Nominalistic scruples aside, however, too much should not be made of
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a substitutional interpretation of predicate quantiers. For, as the basis of
a second-order logic, such an interpretation really does not result in any
increase of logical powers over rst-order logic (cp. Quine 1970, p. 94).
In particular, one important drawback, as Quine himself has pointed out,
is that it precludes impredicative denitions (cp. Hahn and Schilpp 1986,
p. 593). Formally, this means that the comprehension principle must be
restricted so that no formula containing a bound predicate variable is allowed
to comprehend a predicative expression, i.e., to be itself construed as a
predicative context. Thus, the restricted comprehension principle validated
by a substitutional interpretation of predicate quantiers amounts to taking
as an axiom every instance of the following schema:
(CP!) (9F n)(8x1):::(8xn)[F (x1; :::; xn)$ '];
where ' is a formula in which no predicate variable has a bound occurrence
(and in which F n does not occur free and x1; :::; xn are pairwise distinct
individual variables). The appearance here of an existential posit regarding
the existence of a universal in the quantier prex, (9F n), is just that, under
a substitutional interpretation, namely, an appearance and nothing more. In
an applied theory of the second-order logic in question, this principle, under
such an interpretation, involves no ontological commitments beyond what one
is already committed to in the use of the rst-order formulas of that theory.
That is, by interpreting predicate quantiers substitutionally, (CP!) will not
commit us ontologically to anything we are not already committed to in our
use of rst-order formulas, which is where the nominalistic scruples about the
nature of predication come in. The second-order logic that is complete with
respect to such a nominalistic interpretation of predicate quantiers, as is
shown elsewhere, is standard predicative second-order logic (cf. Cocchiarella
1980).24 Given its exclusion of impredicative denitions, the real question,
aside from nominalistic scruples, is why we should adopt such a logic at all.
There is a referential interpretation of predicate quantiers under which
predicates are not to be confused with names and that also results in a
predicative logic, that is, a logic that has a similar constraint imposed on
its comprehension principle. But, unlike the situation with a substitutional
interpretation of predicate quantiers, impredicative denitions are not dis-
allowed in this logic, even though they fail to specify a value of the bound
24An informal sketch and defense of a substitutional interpretation of predicate quanti-
ers can be found in Parsons (1971).
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predicate variables. The framework for this interpretation is what has else-
where been called constructive conceptualism, where the constructive aspect
means only that the concepts in question cannot be specied impredicatively
or, in other words, that predicativeconcepts can be formed only in accor-
dance with the so-called vicious circle principle (cf. Cocchiarella 1986a, chap.
2, secs. 25). By a (predicable) concept we mean here a cognitive capac-
ity that is exercised in judgments, whether expressed overtly in the form of
speech acts or not, and in particular a capacity that underlies our ability
to follow a rule of language regarding the use of a predicative expression.
It is by means of (predicable) concepts as cognitive capacities in this sense
that we are able to characterize and relate objects in various ways in our
use of language as a representational system; for as capacities underlying our
use of predicate expressions, concepts determine the truth conditions that
we associate with those expressions. Indeed, in general, our knowledgeof
the rules of language is really a matter of our having concepts in the sense
of cognitive capacities namely, the capacities for knowing how to use the
expressions governed by those rules and our following those rules is really
a matter of our exercising those concepts as capacities. Note, however, that
having a concept in this sense, although it is a form of knowledge, is not a
form of propositional knowledge. In particular, knowing how to follow a rule
(in the sense intended here) does not mean knowing how to formulate the
rule propositionally. Indeed, in general, in thought and in speech we know
how to follow the rules of language without also knowing how to formulate
them propositionally. Instead of being propositional, this kind of knowl-
edgeis really a form of identity, because the rules for knowing how to use
the expressions of a language, when construed as determinants of our lin-
guistic behavior, are really the same as the cognitive capacities we exercise
in following those rules, and having such a cognitive capacity in this sense is
what we mean by having a concept. Thus, in particular, having a predica-
tiveconcept means knowing how to follow the rule governing the use of a
predicative expression.
As cognitive capacities that can be exercised by the same person at dif-
ferent times, as well as by di¤erent persons at the same time, concepts are
not images or ideas in the sense of particular mental occurrences nor are
they (saturated) objects of any kind for that matter. As cognitive capacities
that might in fact never be exercised at all, concepts are not objects or things
and, in that regard, they cannot be taken as values of the bound individual
variables. Rather, adopting Freges terminology, though not his metaphysics,
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concepts are really unsaturated cognitive structures, which become saturated
only when they are exercised in thought or speech and result in a mental act,
which, when it is overtly expressed, is the same as a speech act. It is the
exercise (or saturation) of a predicable concept in particular which is what
informs such a mental act with a predicative nature.
We reject Quines description of concepts as images or ideas, accordingly,
as well as his claim that concepts belong to a misty realmfor which it is
better that we adopt the nominalist strategyand talk only the of words
and language instead (Quine 1974, pp. 34¤.). In conceptualism, construc-
tive or otherwise, predicate quantiers are not interpreted nominalistically,
i.e., substitutionally, but referentially in that bound predicate variables are
taken as having concepts as unsaturated cognitive structures as their values.
This is not the same notion of reference that is given to rst-order (objec-
tual) quantiers, it must be emphasized but, rather, like Freges notion of
Bedeutung (or Andeutung) as applied to predicates (or predicate variables)
as unsaturated expressions, it must be viewed as a mode of reference that is
sui generis. In this regard, we also reject Quines claim that predicate quan-
tiers, in a context in which predicates are not themselves misconstrued as
abstract singular terms, can have no referential signicance and can therefore
only be interpreted substitutionally.
Despite the similarity with Freges notion of reference for predicate quan-
tiers, concepts in constructive conceptualism, unlike the situation in Freges
logic, cannot be specied impredicatively but, rather, are constrained by laws
of compositionality characteristic of a predicative logic, i.e., laws that are in
accordance with the vicious circle principle. This does not mean that the
comprehension principle regarding predicativeconcepts is the nominalistic
principle (CP!) and, in fact, unlike the situation in nominalism, which is
committed to a logic of predicate quantiers that is not free of existential
presuppositions regarding predicate letters, predicate quantiers in construc-
tive conceptualism are free of just such presuppositions. For this reason, the
comprehension principle that is validated in constructive conceptualism is
even more restrictive than (CP!) and has the following form instead:
(CCP!) (8G1):::(8Gk)(9F n)(8x1):::(8xn)(F (x1; :::; xn)$ '];
where (1) G1; :::; Gk are all the distinct predicate variables occurring free in
', and (2) ' is a formula in which (a) no bound predicate variables occur,
and (b) in which no nonlogical constants occur as well, and (c) in which F n
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has no free occurrences, and, nally, (d) in which the identity sign also does
not occur.
Every instance of the conceptualist principle (CCP!) is obviously also
an instance of the nominalist principle, (CP!), because universal generaliza-
tions of instances of axiom schemas are also assumed to be instances of (or
otherwise derivable from) those schemas. But, not for every instance of the
nominalist principle, (CP!), is also an instance of the conceptualist principle,
(CCP!). In an applied instance of (CP!), for example, but not in an applied
instance of (CCP!), the formula ', which in general will be a rst-order for-
mula of an applied theory, may contain occurrences of the identity sign or of
any predicate constant of the language of that theory. That is because bound
predicate variables, when interpreted substitutionally, have such formulas as
their substituends. In constructive conceptualism, on the other hand, bound
predicate variables are not interpreted substitutionally but referentially, al-
beit not in the sense of reference that applies to bound individual variables.
In particular, bound predicate variables have predicativeconcepts as their
values in a framework in which it is not assumed that all rst-order formulas,
and especially not identity formulas, stand for predicativeconcepts. Unlike
the situation in nominalism with its substitutional interpretation, an open
rst-order formula does not represent a predicativecontext in constructive
conceptualism merely because it is a rst-order formula.
Consider, for example, a theory of membership containing 2as its only
primitive predicate constant and with the following as its principal axiom:
(C) (8F )(9y)(8x)[x 2 y $ F (x)]:
In nominalism, where predicate quantiers are interpreted substitutionally,
this axiom, which otherwise seems quite plausible as a thesis to the e¤ect
that every predicate expression has an extension, leads directly to Russells
paradox. For, by the nominalist principle, (CP!),
(D) (9F )(8x)[F (x)$ x =2 x];
is provable under such an interpretation, from which it follows that x =2 x
can be properly substituted for F in a universal instantiation of (C). In
constructive conceptualism, on the other hand, (D) is not an instance of the
conceptualist principle, (CCP!), and all that follows by Russells argument
from (C) is the fact that 2 cannot stand for a predicative (relational)
concept. That is, instead of the contradiction that results when predicate
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quantiers are interpreted substitutionally, (C), when taken as an axiom of
a theory of membership in constructive conceptualism, only leads to
:(9R)(8x)(8y)[R(x; y)$ x 2 y]:
Thus, as a plausible thesis to the e¤ect that every predicativeconcept has an
extension, (C) is consistent, not inconsistent, in constructive conceptualism.
On Quines nominalist strategy, where concepts are precluded in favor of
words or expressions, the notion of a predicativecontext is purely grammat-
ical; for an open formula is predicativein nominalism just in case it contains
no bound predicate variables. In constructive conceptualism, the notion of
a predicativecontext is semantical, which means that in addition to being
predicativein nominalisms purely grammatical sense, it must also stand for
a predicativeconcept. It is for this reason that the second-order predicative
logic of constructive conceptualism must be free of existential presupposi-
tions regarding predicate constants, which is why the binary predicate, 2,
in a theory of membership having (C) as an axiom, cannot stand for a value
of the bound predicate variables. In general, how we determine which, if any,
of the primitive predicate constants of an applied theory stand for a pred-
icativeconcept depends on the domain of discourse of that theory and how
that domain is to be conceptually represented. In particular, those primitive
predicates that are to be taken as standing for a predicativeconcept will
be stipulated as doing so in terms of the meaning postulatesof that theory,
whereas those that are not will usually occur in axioms that determine that
fact.
Identity and its role in a logical theory marks another important di¤er-
ence between Quines nominalist strategy and our conceptual approach. For
Quine, identity is denable in any applied theory with nitely many predicate
constants in terms of a formula representing indiscernibility with respect to
those predicate constants (cp. Quine 1970, pp. 63¤). That is, in any given
application (based on nitely many predicate constants, which we may as-
sume to be the standardsituation), identity, on Quines nominalist strategy,
is reducible to a rst-order formula, which is why the identity sign is allowed
to occur in instances of (CP!) under its nominalistic, substitutional interpre-
tation. Such a denition will not su¢ ce in constructive conceptualism, on the
other hand, because the rst-order formula in question, even were it to stand
for a predicativeconcept, cannot justify the substitutivity of identicalsin
impredicative contexts, that is, contexts that do not represent a predicative
34
context. The identity sign is not eliminable, or otherwise reducible, in con-
structive conceptualism, in other words, because, on the basis of Leibnizs
law, identity must allow for full substitutivity even in impredicative contexts.
Thus, whereas,
x = y $ (8F )[F (x)$ F (y)];
is provable in standard predicative second-order logic, as based on its nomi-
nalistic substitutional interpretation, the right-to-left direction of this same
formula is not provable in the nonstandard predicative second-order logic
that is validated in constructive conceptualism.
Finally, it is important to see why, although impredicative denitions
are precluded in the predicative logic validated in nominalism, they are not
precluded in the predicative logic validated in constructive conceptualism.
The di¤erence is determined by the role free predicate variables have in each
of these frameworks. On Quines strategy, as already noted, free predicate
variables are construed as dummy schema letters, which in an applied theory
stand for arbitrary rst-order formulas of that theory. This means that the
substitution rule,
if `  ; then `  ['=G(x1; :::; xn)];
is valid on the substitutional interpretation only when ' is predicativein
nominalisms purely grammatical sense, i.e., only when no predicate variable
has a bound occurrence in '. Indeed, the rule must be restricted in this
way on Quines strategy because, otherwise, by taking  to be the following
instance of (CP!),
(9F )(8x1):::(8xn)[F (x1; :::; xn)$ G(x1; :::; xn)];
we would be able to derive the full, unrestricted impredicative comprehen-
sion principle and, thereby, transcend the substitutional interpretation of
predicate quantiers.
In the predicative logic of constructive conceptualism, on the other hand,
the above substitution rule is valid for all formulas, regardless whether or
not they contain any bound predicate variables. But, unlike the situation
in nominalism, the validity of such a rule does not lead to the unrestricted
impredicative comprehension principle. In particular, the above instance of
(CP!) is not also an instance of (CCP!). This means that the notion of a
possible (explicit) denition of a predicate constant is broader in constructive
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conceptualism than it is in nominalism, where only rst-order formulas are al-
lowed as deniens. On the basis of the rule of substitution for all formulas, it
can be shown that denitions in constructive conceptualism whose deniens
contain a bound predicate variable will still be noncreative and will still allow
for the eliminability of dened predicate constants (cf. Cocchiarella 1986a,
chap. 2, sec. 3). Thus, even though constructive conceptualism validates
only a predicative comprehension principle, i.e., a comprehension principle
encompassing laws of compositionality that are in accordance with the vicious
circle principle, it nevertheless allows for impredicative denitions of predi-
cate constants, that is, of predicate constants that do not stand for values
of the bound predicate variables and that cannot therefore be existentially
generalized upon. Thus, by refusing to consider the cognitive structures that
underlie our use of language, Quines nominalist strategy leads us to the
wrong principles underlying our use of language and away from otherwise
acceptable patterns of denition only because they contain bound predicate
variables.
6 Conceptualism Ramied Versus
Nominalism Ramied
There is a way of allowing bound predicate variables to occur in denitions
even on Quines nominalist strategy, which is not to say that such deni-
tions will be impredicative. In particular, a substitutional interpretation of
predicate quantiers can be given not just for standard predicative second-
order logic but for standard ramied second-order logic as well. (Cf. Church
(1956, sec. 58) for a formulation of standard ramied second-order logic.)
The idea of such an interpretation is that we are to begin with a language L0
for standard predicative second-order logic and proceed from there through
a potential innity of languages L1; :::; Ln; ::: (n 2 !), where the predicate
variables of Lj+1 have the formulas of Lj as their substituends, and where
the predicate quantiers binding those variables are interpreted substitution-
ally with respect to their substituends. These languages can be cumulative,
but because the formulas of Lj may contain bound occurrences of predi-
cate variables, the predicate variables of Lj+1 must then be di¤erent from
the predicate variables of Lj. In this way, denitions occurring in Lj+1 can
contain bound predicate variables in their deniens, but only the bound pred-
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icate variables of Lj or of any of the languages preceding Lj in the sequence,
and none at all from Lj+1 or languages succeeding Lj+1 in the sequence.
There is a ramied logic for constructive conceptualism as well, which dif-
fers from the standard ramied second-order logic validated by nominalism
in essentially the same way that the nonstandard predicative logic described
above di¤ers from standard predicative second-order logic. In particular, the
logic is free of existential presuppositions regarding predicates, and for that
reason there is no need for the di¤erent kinds of predicate variables that
nominalism requires for each of the languages Lj. Indeed, because predicate
quantiers are interpreted referentially and not substitutionally, the sort of
ramication validated in this framework is based not on a sequence of lan-
guages but on a sequence of stages of concept-formation instead, where the
concepts formed at one stage become the referents of the concepts formed at
the next. The stages are cumulative, accordingly, and what is added at each
stage j+1 beyond the initial stage of the predicativeconcepts of an applied
theory are concepts whose construction involves a reference to the totality
of concepts constructible at the jth stage. Because these new concepts do
not involve or presuppose any reference to their own totality, i.e., because
they are formed in accordance with the vicious circle principle, they, too,
are considered to be predicativeconcepts. Thus, instead of the innite se-
quence of di¤erent kinds of predicate variables required in nominalism, what
is formally required in constructive conceptualism is a sequence of di¤erent
quantier signs 81;91; :::;8i;9i; ::: (j 2 !   f0g), all of which can be a¢ xed
to the same predicate variables. The predicate quantiers (8jF ) and (9jF ),
where F is an n-place predicate variable, will then be understood to refer in a
given applied theory to all, or to some, respectively, of the n-ary predicative
concepts that can be formed in that theory at the jth stage of the poten-
tially innite sequence of stages of concept-formation in question. But, then,
because open formulas representing predicativecontexts of later stages will
not be substituends of predicate variables bound by quantiers of an earlier
stage, this means that the logic of the quantiers 8j and 9j must be free of
existential presuppositions regarding predicate expressions, which is why the
comprehension principle for this logic must be closed with respect to all the
predicate variables occurring free in the comprehending formula. Thus, as
applied at the jth stage, the ramied conceptualist comprehension principle
that is validated in this framework is the following:
(RCCP!) (8jG1):::(8jGk)(9jF )(8x1):::(8xn)[F (x1; :::; xn)$ '];
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where: (1) G1; :::; Gk are all of the predicate variables occurring free in ';
(2) F is an n-place predicate variable not occurring free in '; (3) x1; :::; xn
are distinct individual variables; and (4) ' is a pure ramied formula, i.e.,
one in which no nonlogical constants occur and in which (a) the identity sign
also does not occur and (b) in which no predicate variable is bound by a
quantier of a stage > j (i.e., for all i  j, neither 8j nor 9j occurs in ').
By way of a more intuitive explanation of this principle, we should note
that a basic assumption of conceptualism, as we understand it here, is that
concept-formation proceeds through developmental stages of increasing struc-
tural complexity, where the later stages contain reconstructions of the earlier.
We assume, moreover, that the psychological mechanism underlying these re-
constructions is something like what Jean Piaget, in his genetic epistemology,
has described as autoregulation, a mechanism that is driven by an equilibra-
tion process that moves us from states of lesser cognitive equilibrium, where
our concepts are unable to explain certain aspects of the environment, to
states of greater equilibrium, where new conceptual structures give us more
explanatory power (cf. Piaget 1977). This same process, at the stage of
conceptual development we are concerned with here, is also called reective
abstraction and, involves a projection of previously constructed concepts onto
a new plane of thought where they are reorganized under the closure condi-
tions of new laws of concept-formation characteristic of the stage in question.
One such pattern of reective abstraction is precisely what is represented by
the ramied comprehension principle and free predicative logic of construc-
tive conceptualism, where each of the successive stages of concept-formation
in the ramied hierarchy is generated by a disequilibrium, or conceptual ten-
sion, between the predicate expressions that stand for predicativeconcepts
at the preceding stage, as opposed to those that do not. The attempt to
overcome this disequilibrium, by rendering more and more such expressions
predicativeat successive stages, is the motivating force that drives us on
from one stage of the ramied hierarchy to the next. In nominalism, on the
other hand, where there is no free logicregarding predicate expressions and
no di¤erence between grammatical and semantical predicativity, there is also
no motivating force that moves us on from one language of the nominalists
ramied hierarchy to the next.
Whatever the motivation for ramication in nominalism, it is clear that
what moves us on from one stage of concept-formation to the next in con-
structive conceptualism is a drive for closure, where all predicates stand for
concepts. Such a closure cannot be realized in constructive conceptualism,
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to be sure, where the principal constraint guiding the formation of predica-
tiveconcepts is their being speciable by conditions that are in accord with
the so-called vicious circle principle. But the particular pattern of reective
abstraction that corresponds to this constraint is not all there is to autoreg-
ulation and the general process of reective abstraction, and, in fact, as a
pattern that represents a drive for closure, it contains the seeds of its own
transcendence to a new plane of thought where such closure is achieved. The
general process of constructing new patterns of reective abstraction is not
itself constrained, in other words, by the so-called vicious circle principle
at least, not as described by Piaget. In particular, after achieving what
Piaget calls the stage of formal operational thought, certain new patterns
of concept-formation are realizable, albeit usually only in post-adolescence,
that involve an idealized transition to a limit, where impredicative concept-
formation becomes possible. Such an idealized transition, in the case of our
ramied logic, is conceptually similar to, but ontologically di¤erent from, an
actual transition to a limit at an innite stage of concept-formation, that is, a
stage that is not only the summation of all of the nite stages of the ramied
hierarchy but one that is also closed with respect to itself. Ontologically, of
course, there cannot be an innite stage of concept-formation for concepts
as cognitive capacities, but that is not to say that an idealized transition to
a limit is conceptually impossible as well. Indeed, in what I have else; called
holistic conceptualism, such an idealized transition to a limit is precisely what
is assumed to be possible on the basis of the pattern of reective abstraction
represented by (RCCP!*). That is, in holistic conceptualism, the drive for
closure upon which the pattern of reective abstraction of ramied construc-
tive conceptualism is based is nally achieved, albeit only as the result of an
idealized transition to a limit and not on the basis of an actual transition.
In this way, conceptualism, by means of a mechanism of autoregulation that
enables us to construct stronger and more complex logical systems out of
weaker ones, is able to validate not only the ramied conceptualist compre-
hension principle but also the full, unqualied impredicative comprehension
principle of standard second-order logic. There is no comparable mechanism
in nominalism that can similarly lead to a validation of the impredicative
comprehension principle.
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7 Constructive Conceptual Realism Versus
Quines View of Conceptualism as a
Ramied Theory of Classes
Quine has not always insisted on by-passing conceptualism in favor of nom-
inalism. In fact, in his 1947 paper, Logic and the Reication of Universals,
where he describes what he takes to be the logical di¤erences between Pla-
tonism, conceptualism, and nominalism, Quine actually suggests that from
a tacticalpoint of view, conceptualism is no doubt the strongest position
of the three(Quine 1953, p. 129). But, by conceptualism, Quine does not
mean what we mean, namely, a theory in which concepts are taken as the val-
ues of bound predicate variables; rather, what he means is a ramied theory
of classes, and in particular a theory based on standard ramied second-
order logic, but with predicates allowed to occur as abstract singular terms
and therefore a theory in which predicate quantiers are to be interpreted
referentially and not substitutionally. Also, by nominalism, Quine means
more than a nominalist theory of predication, for, by his lights, nominalism
requires that we forswear not just all predicable entities (i.e., universals in
the traditional sense) beyond predicates themselves, but all abstract enti-
ties of whatever sort or type. This is a di¤erent view than is maintained,
for example, by Nelson Goodman, according to whom nominalism does not
involve excluding abstract entities ... but requires only that whatever is ad-
mitted as an entity at all be construed as an individual, where to construe
entities as individuals means that we take them as values of the variables
of lowest type in the system(Goodman 1956, p. 17). Quine concurs that,
in the end, any entity at all that we are committed to should be taken as a
value of the bound individual variables, but he also insists that nominalism
precludes abstract entities from being among such values.
The issue here is more than terminological because it turns on Quines
insistence that predicate quantiers can be given a referential interpretation
only if predicates are themselves (mis)construed as singular terms and, given
his further insistence on extensionality, that predicates, as singular terms, can
only denote classes, which then are also the values of the bound predicate
variables. Predication in such a framework can only be membership, in
other words, in which case we might as well replace predicate variables with
individual variables and take classes, the universalsor predicable entities
of this framework, as values of those variables, thereby arriving nally at
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a rst-order theory of classes, to which, we may assume, all other abstract
entities (such as numbers, etc.) are reducible. In this way, nominalism as a
theory of predication, and in particular as a theory that disallows predicate
variables from having any entities (i.e., universalsin the traditional sense)
as their values, becomes nominalism as a doctrine that forswears abstract
entities as the values of the bound individual variables.
Similarly, conceptualism as a theory in which predicate quantiers are
given a referential interpretation becomes a theory in which predicates must
be allowed to occur as abstract singular terms, and therefore the objects de-
noted by predicates as singular terms, which, again, assuming extensionality,
can only be classes, must also be the values of the bound predicate variables.
Predication is again replaced by membership, and predicate variables and
predicate quantiers are replaced by individual variables and rst-order (ob-
jectual) quantiers. In this way, conceptualism as a theory of predication,
and in particular as a theory in which bound predicate variables have con-
cepts as their values, becomes a rst-order theory of membership in which
concepts are reied as classes. Where conceptualism di¤ers from Platonism
in this regard is in having its logic based on a predicative, as opposed to
an impredicative, comprehension principle, and in particular on the pred-
icative comprehension principle of standard ramied second-order logic, but
extended so that predicate letters are allowed to occur as abstract singular
terms.
Thus, on Quines description, conceptualism begins with an innity of
languages L0; :::; Ln; :::(n 2 !), where the individual variables of L0 have
only concrete objects as their values. Then, the rst step of reication of
classes is to be limited to classes such that membership in any one of them
is equivalent to some condition expressible in L0; and correspondingly for re-
lations(Quine 1953, p. 123). Calling these classes and relations objects of
order 1, we are to begin binding predicate letters with the idea that they are
to admit objects of order 1 as values(ibid.), which means that the predicate
letters, to which we are to attach the exponent 1, are allowed to occur as
abstract singular terms as well. L1 is the language formed by thus extending
L0. Then, the next step is to reify all further classes of such kind that mem-
bership in any one of them is equivalent to some condition expressible in L1;
and similarly for relations(ibid., p. 124). Calling these classes F 2, G2,
etc., with the idea that they take objects of order 2 as their values. Contin-
uing thus to L3; L4, and so on, we introduce bound [predicate] variables with
ever-increasing exponents, concomitantly admitting increasingly wide ranges
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of classes and relations as values of our variables(ibid.). Finally, we can
omit the polyadic use of bindable variables; and we can rewrite the residual
forms F 3x, G2F 3, etc., in the preferred notation x0 2 y3, y3 2 z2, etc
.... There are no restrictions analogous to those of the theory of types: no
requirements of consecutiveness, indeed no restrictions on meaningfulness of
combinations(ibid.).
The idea that bound predicate variables can have unsaturated concepts
as their values, and therefore that what nominalized predicates denote as
abstract singular terms, assuming that they denote at all, cannot be the
values of those variables is a notion that Quine never considers, and yet it is
a notion that is fundamental to conceptualism as we have described it here. It
is also a notion that conceptualism shares with Frege (or really adopted from
Frege), who assumed not only that nominalized predicates denote but that
what they denote are the extensions of the concepts that those predicates
otherwise stand for in their role as predicates. Such an assumption about
nominalized predicates goes beyond conceptualism, as we understand it here,
but it does not go beyond what might be called conceptual realism. Contrary
to Quines view, in other words, conceptualism not only is not the same as a
theory of classes, ramied or otherwise, but it does not of itself even contain
a theory of classes. Conceptual realism, on the other hand, does contain
such a theory, and constructive conceptual realism in particular contains a
ramied theory but not one that is based on standard ramied second-order
logic. It is not the standard, but the nonstandard, ramied second-order
logic described above that is the framework that should be associated with
constructive conceptual realism when nonvacuous nominalized predicates are
added to it as abstract singular terms.
We will not go into the details of the formulation of constructive concep-
tual realism, which is given elsewhere (in Cocchiarella 1986b), except perhaps
to note that we now apply the stagequantiers 8j and 9j, for all positive
integers j, not just to predicate variables but to individual variables as well,
to which we also continue to a¢ x the absolute quantiers 8 and 9. (The
latter are a¢ xed to predicate variables as well only in holistic conceptualism,
realist or otherwise.) Thus, whereas the realist assumption that every n-ary
concept of each stage j of the ramied hierarchy has an object of that stage
as its correlate is formulated as follows,
(8jF n)(9jx)(F = x);
the assumption that every object of stage j is an object simpliciter is formu-
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lated as
(8jx)(9y)(x = y):
Also, because not all objects that are correlates of concepts of later stages
will be values of variables bound by quantiers of earlier stages, the logic
of the quantiers 8j and 9j, as a¢ xed to individual variables, will be free
of existential presuppositions regarding singular terms, just as the logic of
the same quantiers, when a¢ xed to predicate variables, is free of existential
presuppositions regarding predicate expressions. Thus, just as the compre-
hension principle of ramied constructive conceptualism must be closed with
respect to the predicate variables occurring free in the comprehending for-
mula, so too, the comprehension principle for constructive conceptual realism
must be closed with respect to the individual as well as the predicate vari-
ables occurring free in that formula. In terms of -abstracts, the ramied
conceptualist comprehension principle for this logic can then be formulated
as follows:
(RCCP!) (8jy1):::(8jym)(8jG1):::(8jGk)(9jF )([x1:::xn'] = F );
where: (1) ' is a formula in which no nonlogical constants occur and in which
the identity sign also does not occur; (2) F is an n-place predicate variable
not occurring free in '; (3) for all i  j, neither 8j nor 9j occur in '; (4)
G1; :::Gk are all of the distinct predicate variables occurring in '; and (5)
y1; :::; ym; x1; :::; xn are all of the distinct individual variables occurring free
in '.
The assumption that the objects denoted by nominalized predicates are
classes, specically the extensions of the predicative concepts that those
predicates otherwise stand for in their role as predicates, can be made explicit
in the form of an extensionality axiom. Membership can then be dened for
each stage as follows:
x 2j y =df (9jF )[y = F ^ F (x)]:
But even without the extensionality axiom, it is provable in constructive
conceptual realism that every predicativeunary concept of any stage j will
have an extension in the following sense,
(8jF )(9y)(8x)[x 2j y $ F (x)];
which suggests that we might avoid extensionality altogether and assume
that concept-correlates are intensional objects instead. Following something
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like Russells strategy in his no classes theory, all talk of classes can be
contextually dened in terms of extensional talk about intensional objects,
where, by an intensional object, we mean the intension of a concept in the
sense of a reication of the truth conditions determined by the di¤erent possi-
ble applications of that concept. Thus, not only does a class as the extension
of a concept have its being in that concept but so does an intensional object
as the intension of that concept. It is in this way that conceptual realism is
able to explain how, by means of our conceptual abilities, we are able to lay
hold upon the intension of a concept, and thereby its extension as well, by
starting out from the concept as a cognitive capacity.
Bertrand Russell, in his own intensional ramied logic, thought that he
had to assume what he called the reducibility axiom, which in our formulation
is the thesis that every concept of any stage j is coextensive with a concept
of the rst stage, or, formally,
(8jG)(91F )(8x1):::(8xn)[F (x1; :::; xn)$ G(x1; :::; xn)];
in order to give an adequate account of classes in terms of intensional entities.
Such an axiom, as Quine has observed, does hot accord well with the con-
structive approach of Russells ramied type theory, and certainly it cannot
be validated in constructive conceptualism. But Quine seems to go too far
in claiming that the axiom of reducibility implies the superuousness of the
very distinctions that gave it substance(Quine 1963, p. 253). For, unless
we assume the extensionality axiom, the reducibility axiom does not imply
(8jG)(91F )(G = F )
in the ramied logic of constructive conceptual realism. The reducibility ax-
iom does have some other interesting consequences in this framework, how-
ever, such as that identity cannot be represented by any relational predica-
tiveconcept of any stage j, that is, formally, it implies
:(9jR)(8x)(8y)[R(x; y)$ x = y]:
This shows that Russells claim that, on the basis of the reducibility axiom,
identity can be adequately analyzed as indiscernibility with respect to all the
predicativeconcepts of the rst stage is false. Indeed, where indiscernibility
in this restricted sense is dened as follows,
x 1 y =df (81F )[F (x)$ F (y)];
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it can be proved on the basis of the reducibility axiom that there are non-
identical objects (concept-correlates in particular) that are indiscernible in
this sense. That is, instead of showing that identity can be analyzed as in-
discernibility with respect to the predicativeconcepts of the rst stage, the
reducibility axiom actually implies the opposite in having
(9x)(9y)(x 1 y ^ x 6= y)
as one of its consequences.25
It is noteworthy, incidentally, that each of these consequences of the re-
ducibility axiom has already been noted and discussed in somewhat di¤erent
terms in the context the impredicative logic T mentioned in Section 5. For
if we assume that the identity sign does not occur in any of the -abstracts
of the ramied logic of constructive conceptual realism (i.e., as well as in
none of the instances of (RCCP!), from which it is already barred) then,
by replacing each occurrence of the stagequantiers 8j and 9j by the ab-
solute quantiers 8 and 9, it can be shown that every theorem of the ramied
logic in question, plus the reducibility axiom as well, is a theorem of T,
which, as already noted, has an absolute consistency proof. If we allow the
identity sign to occur in -abstracts, as is only proper in conceptualism, a
similar relative consistency proof can be given with respect to the system T,
which has even the logic of the absolute quantiers 8 and 9 free of existential
presuppositions regarding singular terms.26
What makes the reducibility axiom useful in a ramied logic is that it
enables us to prove an extensional impredicative comprehension principle,
which can be used in place of an extensionality axiom in the development of
a contextually dened theory of classes as the extensions of concepts. But
this does not make the reducibility axiom any the less implausible as a thesis
about predicativeconcepts. In fact, given its impredicative content, the re-
ducibility axiom is really a poor compromise between holistic conceptualism
with its validation of an impredicative comprehension principle and a strict
version of constructive conceptualism that refuses to acknowledge any psy-
chological mechanism (such as Piagets autoregulation) that would enable us
25For a proof of these and other consequences of the reducibility axiom in the ramied
logic of constructive conceptual realism, see Cocchiarella (1986b, sec. 6).
26I am grateful to Max Freund, for pointing out that allowing the identity sign to occur in
-abstracts means that the consistency proof for the ram constructive conceptual realism
must be relativized not to T*, as I originally claimed, but to T instead.
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to construct impredicative concepts. If an impredicative comprehension prin-
ciple is to be validated at all, in other words, then it is conceptually clearer
that it be validated on the basis of an idealized transition to a limit and a
pattern of reective abstraction by means of which impredicative concept-
formation becomes possible. Such a transition does not nullify the ramied
hierarchy of predicativeconcepts, and in fact were we to add an epistemic
operator k, which can be informally read as, It is constructively knowable
that, then one important di¤erence between the predicative comprehension
principle (RCCP!) of constructive conceptualism and the impredicative
comprehension principle, (CP), of holistic conceptualism is that k can be
validly inserted only after the existential posit (9jF ) in (RCCP!), but, not
after the existential posit (9F ) in (CP). It is not just that there is a pred-
icativeconcept that is represented by any formula fullling the predicative
conditions of (RCCP!) but, rather, that there is a predicativeconcept for
which it is constructively knowable that it is represented by that formula. No
such constructive knowledge can be similarly assumed regarding the concepts
posited in the impredicative comprehension principle.
The transition to holistic conceptualism and the validation of an impred-
icative comprehension principle regarding concept-formation does not mean
that a similar transition to a realist assumption about nominalized predicates
is also thereby validated. Indeed, because some nominalized predicates, such
as the -abstract for the Russell predicate, [x(9G)(x = G ^ :G(x))], will
necessarily fail to denote any object at all, despite the fact that the predicate
itself, in its role as a predicate, will stand for an impredicative concept, the
logic of the absolute quantiers 8 and 9, when a¢ xed to individual vari-
ables, must be free of existential presuppositions regarding singular terms,
which means that no realist theses beyond the original realist assumptions
of constructive conceptual realism will follow in this extended framework.
This allows for an intermediate position between constructive conceptual re-
alism and one or another version of a more thoroughgoing holistic conceptual
realism, where, on the intermediate position, it is not the specication of im-
predicative concepts that is objectionable, but the assumption of objects,
e.g., classes, corresponding to such concepts. By covering all that one might
want to do with the reducibility axiom, and more, such an intermediate po-
sition shows why, on at least our version of conceptualism, where there is a
di¤erence between the positing of concepts and the positing of classes as the
extensions of those concepts, Quine is wrong to claim that the reducibility
axiom has the e¤ect of reinstating the whole platonistic logic of classes
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(Quine 1953, p. 127).
8 Holistic Conceptual Realism Versus
Quines Class Platonism
Despite his statement that conceptualism, when compared with nominal-
ism and Platonism, is the strongest position of the three, Quine, in the
end, opts for Platonism, which for him means a full, impredicative theory
of classes. Conceptualism, as a ramied theory of classes, is too weak a
framework in which to develop the mathematics (such as the theory of real
numbers) that is needed in empirical science. In addition, the idea of classes
as conceptual in nature and created by man(ibid., p. 123) and the idea
in particular of the classes of the ramied hierarchy being generated by a
progressive creation is at best a metaphor according to Quine, for whom
it would be a mistake to suppose that this metaphor really accounts for
the classes or explains them away(ibid., p. 127). Thus, on Quines view,
the conceptualist and the platonist are alike: they both assume universals,
classes, irreducibly as values of their bound variables(ibid.), in which case
we might as well join the Platonist and assume an impredicative theory of
classes adequate for the purposes of empirical science.
Quine is right in noting that a ramied predicative logic is too weak for
the purposes of the theory of real numbers. But the issue here is not just
one of ontology, that is, of whether or not a ramied predicative logic can
provide an adequate ontological account of the theory of real numbers as
mathematical objects. What is inadequate about the logic of constructive
conceptual realism in an even more fundamental way is that it cannot provide
an account of the kind of impredicative concept-formation that is necessary
for the development and use of the theory of real numbers, and which, as
a matter of cultural history, we have in fact achieved since the nineteenth
century. The concept of a least upper bound, for example, or of the limit
of a converging sequence of rational numbers, is an impredicative concept
that was not acquired by the mathematical community until a little more
than a century ago; and although, in our own time, it is not usually a part
of a persons conceptual repertoire until post-adolescence, nevertheless, with
proper training and conceptual development, it is a concept that most of
us can come to acquire as a cognitive capacity. Yet, notwithstanding these
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facts of cultural history and conceptual development, it is also a concept
that cannot be accounted for from within the framework of constructive
conceptualism. The constraints of the vicious circle principle, at least in the
way they apply to concept-formation, simply do not conform to the facts of
conceptual development in an age of advanced scientic knowledge.
This does not mean that constructive conceptualism is wrong in its ac-
count of concept-formation as regards a certain stage of conceptual develop-
ment. In fact, to the contrary, it is an essential precursor, both historically
and ontogenetically, to the kind of reective abstraction that leads to im-
predicative concept-formation.27 What is wrong is claiming, as Russell and
Quine do from the perspective of their di¤erent versions of Platonism, that
the whole point of a ramied predicative logic is avoidance of Russells para-
dox. Certainly, that was not why Hermann Weyl adopted a predicative logic
as the basis of his constructive mathematics; nor was it the reason why
Henri Poincaré originally proposed his vicious circle principle, which Rus-
sell accepted and adapted to his own purposes (cf. Weyl 1918 and Poincaré
1906). In fact, as indicated in the preceding section, the logical structure
of the kinds of concepts that are represented in constructive conceptualism,
when viewed from within the framework of holistic conceptualism, provides
the basis for just the kind of epistemic distinction that Weyl and Poincaré
had in mind, namely, the distinction between knowledge of abstract objects
that is constructive, as opposed to knowledge that is not, and in particular,
knowledge that is based on impredicative concepts.
In regard to ontology, or any realist assumptions that can be logically
associated with impredicative concept-formation, it should again be empha-
sized that the transition from constructive conceptualism to holistic concep-
tualism enables us to validate only the impredicative comprehension principle
27In Inhelder and Piaget (1958) it is pointed out that the maturation of the human
nervous system in adolescence can do no more than determine the totality of possibilities
and impossibilities [of concept-formation] at a given stageand that a particular social
environment remains indispensable for the realization of these possibilities(p. 337). That
is, conceptual development can be accelerated or retarded as a function of cultural and
educational conditions, which is why the history of formal structures is linked to the
evolution of culture and collective representations as well as their ontogenetic history
(ibid.). That is also why, in regard to our present context, even the post-adolescents
of primitive societies do not appear to have any ímpredicative concepts as part of their
repertoire of cognitive abilities.
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for concept-formation, that is, the principle,
(CP) (9F )([x1:::xn'] = F );
where ' is any formula of the extended grammar in which the n-place pred-
icate variable F does not occur free. What it does not do is enable us to
also validate an impredicative theory of classes, or intensional objects, as the
correlates of concepts. Of course, we do still have the realist assumption of
constructive conceptual realism, which with the epistemic operator k can
now be formulated as,
(8jF n)(9jx)k(F = x):
But beyond the ramied classes, or intensional objects, that are thus as-
sumed, nothing can be proved about which, if any, of the concepts specied
in (CP) also have objects corresponding to them.
What can be proved negatively, on the other hand, is that not every
concept of the extended framework can have an object as its correlate and,
in particular, that there can be no such object corresponding to the concept
that the Russell predicate stands for. That is, even though
(9F )([x(9G)(x = G ^ :G(x))] = F )
is provable in the extended system, so is
:(9y)([x(9G)(x = G ^ :G(x))] = y)
The result of extending constructive conceptual realism so as to allow for im-
predicative concept-formation takes us only to the intermediate framework
noted at the end of the last section, in other words, i.e., the framework inter-
mediate between constructive conceptual realism and a more thoroughgoing
holistic conceptual realism. Such an intermediate position is interesting and
useful in emphasizing the distinction between conceptualism and realism, i.e.,
between concept-formation and ontology, but in the end it leaves us with-
out a logical foundation for an impredicative theory of classes other than
something like Quines version of Platonism.
One might well assume that the ontology of the abstract objects of con-
ceptual realism, be it of a constructive or a holistic conceptual realism, is a
form of Platonism, in which case we might as well call the ontological ver-
sion of conceptual realism in question conceptual Platonism. This is not the
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only way to interpret the ontology of conceptual realism, as we shall see;
but, even if we were to accept this interpretation, there is still an important
di¤erence between the indirect Platonism thus assumed and the direct, or
simple, Platonism of a theory of classes such as Quine intends. Indeed, from
the point of view of conceptualism or, rather, conceptual realism, the prob-
lem with a direct Platonism (whether as an impredicative theory of classes,
as in Quines version, or, as an impredicative theory of properties and re-
lations, as in Russells and Freges versions) is that it fails to explain how
it is possible to have knowledge of the independently real abstract entities
that it assumes, if all knowledge must be grounded in psychological states
and processes that do not have such abstract entities as constituents. If the
mind and epistemology are to be naturalized, as Quine himself has argued,
and as they are assumed to be in conceptualism, then the problem of how
our knowledge of the abstract entities assumed in Platonism can be possible
seems insuperable unless, that is, all our knowledge of abstract entities can
be explained in terms of concepts as cognitive capacities, which in fact is
just what is claimed in conceptual realism. Indeed, according to conceptual
realism, whether Platonist or otherwise, we are able to have knowledge of
abstract objects at all only because they are the correlates (e.g., extensions
or intensions) of concepts, which is to say that we are conceptually able to
lay hold upon such objects only by starting out from the concepts whose
correlates they are.
Quine agrees with conceptual realism, incidentally, about how we rst
arrive at the notion of a class: namely, that we do so through the process
of nominalization, that is, the process by which predicate expressions are
transformed into abstract singular terms (cf. Quine 1974, chap. III). But,
instead of basing his account on concepts as the cognitive capacities under-
lying our use of predicates, Quine adopts the nominalist strategy described
earlier where predicate quantiers, at least initially, are interpreted substitu-
tionally. Once we learn how to nominalize predicates and begin using them as
abstract singular terms, according to Quine, the nominalism we began with
is given over to a Platonism, where nominalized predicates, in accordance
with the assumption of extensionality, are taken as denoting classes, which
now can be specied even impredicatively as the values of bound predicate
variables. Finally, predication is replaced by membership and nominalized
predicates and predicate quantiers are given over to individual variables
and objectual quantiers in a rst-order set theory in which classes, as
Platonic entities, can be talked about independently of any predicates whose
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extensions they might or might not be. Thus, by adopting a nominalist strat-
egy and by-passing concepts, Quine moves from his basically correct insight
about how nominalization is the key to our understanding of abstract objects
which, epistemically, should lead at most to an indirect Platonism in which
the role of nominalized predicates is distinguished from that of the predicates
themselves to his direct Platonism of set theory as an impredicative theory
of classes.
As a version of conceptual realism, which in general maintains that all ab-
stract objects, be they classes, numbers, or intensional objects, are concept-
correlates, conceptual Platonism is an indirect and not a direct Platonism.
For as concept-correlates, all abstract objects have their being, at least in
an epistemological sense, in the concepts whose correlates they are. This
means not only that our representation of abstract objects must be seen as
the result of the process of nominalization, that is, of transforming predicate
expressions into abstract singular terms, whereby we purport to denote the
contents or extensions of the concepts that those predicates otherwise stand
for in their role as predicates, but, in addition, that such nominalization
is not to be explained away by replacing a second-order logic of predication
with a rst-order theory of membership (or even, for that matter, with a rst-
order theory of exemplication). Thus, even though abstract entities may
be assumed to exist in a realm that transcends space, time and causality,
and in that sense preexistthe evolution of consciousness and the cognitive
capacities that we exercise in thought and our use of language, nevertheless,
from an epistemological point of view, no such entity can be assumed to ex-
ist otherwise than as the correlate of a concept. Quine is right in claiming,
at least as far as conceptual Platonism is concerned, that classes have the
same kind of reality for the conceptualist as they do for the Platonist; but by
ignoring concepts and predication and describing conceptualism as a theory
of. classes and membership simpliciter, he fails to see the essential epistemo-
logical role that concepts have in explaining how our knowledge of classes in
the logical sense is even possible at all.
Conceptual Platonism is not the only way to interpret the ontology of
conceptual realism, however. There is an alternative interpretation, for ex-
ample, according to which all abstract objects are in some sense man-made,
at least in their origin, despite also having a certain degree of autonomy.28
28Cf. Popper and Eccles (1977, chap. P2) for a description of such a view of abstract
objects as the denizens of what is there called world 3. It should perhaps be noted that
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They are, as it were, evolutionary products of language and culture, by which
we mean that they depend essentially on language and culture for their ex-
istence. But, notwithstanding that dependence, they are also an essential
part of the means whereby further cultural development that is, cultural
evolution beyond the point of their creation becomes possible. As cultural
products, their existence is primarily the result of the development and use in
language of the process of nominalization, i.e., of the process whereby predi-
cate expressions are transformed into abstract singular terms. It was through
the institutionalization of this process that abstract entities achieved a cer-
tain autonomy and, in time, became reied as objects. Thus, it is not just
a matter of how each of us rst learns how to talk about classes in todays
culture, although that is important as well if we assume what Piaget calls
the fundamental hypothesis of genetic epistemology,namely, that there is
a parallel between the ontogenetic and the historical development of scientic
knowledge (Piaget 1970, p. 13). Rather, it is a matter of how, over a span of
time, through the evolution of the use of nominalized predicates as abstract
singular terms, humanity rst came to talk about abstract objects at all, and
of how, in particular, it came to talk about classes as the extensions of the
concepts underlying its use of predicates. Abstract objects do not exist in a
Platonic realm outside of space, time, and causality, on this interpretation,
but are in fact man-madeobjects, the result, in e¤ect, of an ontological
projection inherent in the development and institutionalization in language
of the process of nominalization. Accordingly, on this interpretation, Quine
is wrong in claiming that the view of classes as conceptual in nature and
created by man is only a metaphor and that classes must have the same
kind of reality for the conceptualist as they do for the Platonist.
On this interpretation of conceptual realism, what is reied, or projected
into the domain of objects, are the contents of our concepts as cognitive ca-
pacities, where, by the content of a concept, we mean the truth conditions
determined by the di¤erent possible applications of that concept, i.e., the
conditions under which objects can be said to fall under that concept. If it is
assumed that truth conditions can be given only an extensional description,
then a class, as the extension of a concept, might well be regarded as the
result of reifying the truth conditions determined by that concept, in which
although our view of abstract objects supports the Popper-Eccles interactionist theory of
mind, it does not also depend on that theory.
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case we might also assume an axiom of extensionality for our logic. But if, as
seems more natural, it is assumed that the truth conditions determined by
our concepts can be given an intensional description as well, then abstract
objects will have whatever form or degree of intensionality that those truth
conditions will be assumed to have, in which case an axiom of extensional-
ity, and perhaps even an axiom of intensionality, will not be warranted. Of
course, in some cases, a concept, such as that represented by the Russell
predicate, [x(9G)(x = G ^ :G(x))], will determine truth conditions that,
on pain of contradiction, cannot be reied, and so the concept itself must
be left as having no object as its projected correlate. That is, because the
truth conditions determined by an impredicative concept may presuppose
the reication of the truth conditions of one or more logically-related con-
cepts, it may well turn out that those truth conditions cannot in turn be
reied. Abstract objects are not createdat will but can be assumed to exist
only in accordance with certain constraints imposed on the use of language,
including, in particular, constraints regarding consistency.
We cannot assume, accordingly, that all of the concepts specied in the
impredicative comprehension principle, (CP), have intensions, or exten-
sions, corresponding to them as objects. But that does not mean that there
is no principled way by which to assume that most do. One such way, for
example, is given by the system HST, already described in Section 4, in
terms of which the ultimate classes of Quines settheoryML are better ex-
plained as concepts, which now can be understood as the concepts of holistic
conceptual realism or, rather, of one version of such. The axiom schema of
HST that describes in a principled way su¢ cient conditions for positing
objects as the correlates of concepts is called (9/HSCP). In this schema,
the two principal constraints for positing an object as the correlate of a con-
cept, as represented by a -abstract, [x1:::xn'], are (1) that the -abstract
' must be restricted so as to refer only to concepts that have a concept-
correlate, i.e., concepts whose truth conditions can be reied.29 If the truth
conditions determined by an impredicative concept are homogeneously strat-
ied, then those conditions can be reied as an object if the truth conditions
determined by any concept presupposed by that concept can also be reied.
Thus, we return to the idea of stratication as a fundamental feature not
of concept-formation but of the conditions su¢ cient for reifying the truth
29A detailed, formal description of the axiom scheme (9/HSCP) can be found in
Cocchiarella (1986a, p. 229, and 1987, pp. 106¤.).
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conditions of our concepts as cognitive capacities, which in turn is the basis
of an impredicative theory of classes.
Another principled way by which to assume that most of the concepts
specied in the impredicative comprehension principle, (CP), have an in-
tension or extension corresponding to them as an object is given in the system
T, which, as explained in Section 5, is the most natural way of developing
the system T0 to an impredicative logic having (CP

) as its comprehen-
sion principle. T0, it will be remembered, represents the original logical
context (i.e., the second-order logic with nominalized predicates as abstract
singular terms) that Quine claimed was inconsistent by Russells paradox.
The simplest extension of T0 to an impredicative logic is the system T
,
which di¤ers from T in containing a rst-order logic that is not free of
existential presuppositions for singular terms, and which avoids Russells
paradox by disallowing the identity sign from occurring in -abstracts. The
latter exclusion is inappropriate in holistic conceptualism, however, where
impredicative concepts such as that represented by the Russell predicate,
[x(9G)(x = G ^ :G(x))], are also recognized as cognitive capacities (which
can be acquired at least in post-adolescence and in a suitable cultural envi-
ronment). Allowing the identity sign to occur in -abstracts brings us back
to Russells paradox, however, which, as already explained, can be avoided
by taking nominalized predicates to be free of existential presuppositions as
abstract singular terms. The result of making these changes to T is the
systemT, which is why we say thatT

 is the most natural way of developing
T0 into a system containing the full, impredicative comprehension principle,
(CP) where even the identity sign is allowed to occur in -abstracts.
The logical context that is represented by T0 is also described by Quine
in Logic and the Reication of Universals, incidentally, where it is again er-
roneously claimed to be inconsistent. Indeed, it is on the basis of that claim
that the logical context represented by T0 is changed, or rather modied, by
Quine and developed into the ramied theory of classes, that he associates
with conceptualism. Of course, as we have already noted, the idea that a
ramied predicative logic for constructive conceptual realism is motivated by
a response to Russells paradox is not correct. Nevertheless, there is some
irony in the fact that not only is T0 consistent, but that its most natural
development into an impredicative logic, i.e., into the system T, can also
be seen as a natural way of extending the ramied predicative logic of con-
structive conceptual realism into a more thoroughgoing holistic conceptual
realism. This can be seen by noting that if we begin with the ramied concep-
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tualist comprehension principle, (RCCP!), as described in Section 7, and
attempt to extend it to an impredicative principle, where the logic of predi-
cate quantiers is no longer free of existential presuppositions, then the only
constraint imposed by (RCCP!) that remains is that the identity sign is
not to occur in the -abstract in question. That is, the natural way of extend-
ing (RCCP!) to an impredicative principle results in the comprehension
principle for T, which, except for the exclusion of the identity sign from
-abstracts, is the same as (CP). As a thesis about concept-formation, that
exclusion, as we have said, is unacceptable in holistic conceptualism. But, as
a thesis describing a su¢ cient condition for positing objects as the correlates
of the concepts specied in (CP) and, in particular, a thesis that sees iden-
tity as the real culprit in generating Russells paradox, then the principle in
question, which I have elsewhere called (9=CP ), might well be acceptable
on the basis of a doctrine about identity as a transcendental notion. Thus,
it is not the system T to which we should turn as the natural way to
extend the ramied predicative logic of constructive conceptual realism into
a holistic conceptual realism but the system T instead, which contains the
axiom schema (9=CP ).
As in the corresponding axiom schema of HST there are two primary
constraints described in (9=CP ) for positing an object as the correlate
of a concept as specied in (9=CP ) by means of a -abstract. These
are: (1) that all of the predicate quantiers occurring in the -abstract are
restricted in such a way that they refer only to concepts that have concept-
correlates, i.e., concepts whose truth conditions can be reied; and (2) that
the identity sign does not occur in that -abstract at all. In other words, if the
truth conditions determined by any concept presupposed by an impredicative
concept can be reied, then so can the truth conditions determined by that
concept as long as those conditions do not turn in any way on the concept
of identity (which in T is a transcendental notion applicable to concepts as
well as to objects).
We thus have two versions of holistic conceptual realism, namely, HST
and T, within which we can embed the ramied predicative logic of con-
structive conceptual realism. Of course, the epistemic operator, k, will not
occur in the existential posits of (9/HSCP) or (9/CP ) the way it occurs
in the existential posits of constructive conceptual realism. For the abstract
objects that are posited in these schemas are in general not posited as the
correlates of predicative, or constructive, concepts. Both versions contain,
either directly or indirectly (depending on ones view of the extensionality
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axiom), an impredicative theory of classes, one corresponding to Quines set
theory ML, and the other corresponding to a natural development of a log-
ical context that Quine incorrectly described as inconsistent. Both provide
in this way the basis of a modied account of logicism, founded not on a
direct Platonism but at most on indirect Platonism, and perhaps even on
a non-Platonistic account of abstract objects as products of cultural evolu-
tion. Neither framework alone, for reasons already indicated, will su¢ ce as
a foundation for classical mathematics without further posits regarding the
reication of the truth conditions determined by certain concepts, such as
the concept of a natural number. For conceptualism, however, the important
point is not so much the ontology of classical mathematics as the analysis
of its concepts, i.e., the representation of those concepts in terms of logical
syntax alone. It is in this way, as we have said, that we see where logic
leaves o¤ and mathematics begins, and not in Quines way of taking logic to
consist only of elementary, rst-order logic and mathematics to consist of a
rst-order settheory, with or without ultimate classes.
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